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I.

I NTRODUCTION

You are the owner of a publicly traded fortune 500 company
who spent a great deal of time, money, and effort building your
brand into a well-respected business. When you sign up to register
a Twitter account under your company’s name, you are inform ed
that another user has already registered that name. 1 It turns out

* J.D. Candidate, University of San Diego, School of Law, 2017. I would like
to thank USD law professor Lisa Ramsey for her contributions, guidance, and
mentorship throughout this process. I would also like to thank my father, Hon.
Peter S. Doft, for his numerous edits. Finally, I would like to thank the staff
and executive board of THE JOHN MARSHAL LAW REVIEW for their hard work in
making this publication possible. Though many have contributed, all errors and
oversights are my own.
1. Social media websites are distinguishable from traditional websites in
that they allow users to create and contribute, at least in part, to the website’s
content. See PAUL D. MCG RADY, JR., MCG RADY ON SOCIAL MEDIA § 1.01
(Matthew Bender & Co.). These web-based platforms can be accessed on any
device that has access to the Internet, be it computer, phone, or tablet. Id.
Examples of social media websites include Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and
YouTube. See Randy Milanovic, The World's 21 Most Important Social Media
Sites and Apps in 2015, SOCIAL MEDIA TODAY (Apr. 13, 2015),
www.socialmediatoday.com/social-networks/2015-04-13/worlds-21-most959
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that this other user has been posting statuses and interacting with
customers as if he were representing your company. This
hypothetical situation was not so postulatory for Oneok, Inc. 2 In
2009, Oneok found out that an anonymous user was posting from
an account with its trademarked name and logo on Twitter. 3 This
act, commonly known as “username squatting,” is one of many
intellectual property issues that can arise on social media websites,
as are traditional trademark infringement and copyright
infringement. 4
A trademark or copyright owner currently has three potential
courses of action against an alleged infringer on social media: (1)
report the infringement directly to the social media website, (2)
send a cease-and-desist letter to the infringing party, or (3)
commence a lawsuit. 5 However, none of these options is ideal. 6
Though reporting the infringement directly to the social media site
is quick and inexpensive, the system as a whole lacks transparency;
it is unclear how long it will take for the website to take action and
remove infringing material, and it is often difficult for either party
to know what constitutes a violation due to the vague and
inconsistent language used by various social media platforms in
their terms of usage and services agreements. 7 The cease and desist
option is often very effective and easy for intellectual property
owners who would gladly sacrifice transparency for the speedy
removal of the infringing material. 8 However, sending a cease-andimportant-social-media-sites-and- apps-2015. I will discuss each of these
websites in detail later in this paper. See infra Part III.
2. See Compl. for Trademark Infringement, Oneok, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc., No.
4:09-cv-00597-TCK-TLW (N.D. Okla. Sept. 15, 2009).
3. See id. at 3.
4. See, e.g., Username Squatting Policy, Twitter, https://support.twitter.co m
/articles/18370 (last visited Sept. 15, 2016). See also Darin Klemchuk,
Counteracting Copyright and Trademark Infringement Online, ENTREPRENE UR
(Mar. 24, 2014), www.entrepreneur.com/article/232405.
5. See Liisa M. Thomas & Robert H. Newman, Five Steps to Protect Your
Trademarks in the Web 2.0 World, WIPO MAGAZINE (Sep. 2010),
www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2010/05/article_0006.htm l.
6. For a discussion on these three courses of action and why none of them is
ideal, see infra Part II.
7. See MCG RADY, supra note 1, at § 12.01 (noting that “social media user
name disputes can cause great consternation and even monetary harm to the
abused party and, due to the wide variety of approaches taken by the various
social media providers, can have wildly disparate outcomes and resolution
periods”); see also Lil Miss Hot Mess, Shame on Facebook: How Zuckerberg's
Confusing "Real Names" Policy Hurts More Than It Helps, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 15, 2015), www.huffingtonpost.com/lil-miss-hot-mess/shame-on-facebookhow-zuc_b_7789438.html?utm_hp_ref=gay-voices (stating that Facebook CEO
Mark Zuckerberg admitted confusion in Facebook’s policies by acknowledging
that there was “some confusion about what our policy actually is”).
8. See Marketa Trimble, Setting Foot on Enemy Ground: Cease-and-Desist
Letters, DMCA Notifications and Personal Jurisdiction in Declaratory
Judgment Actions, 50 IDEA 777, 784 (2010) (stating that cease-and-desist
letters “may have a number of effects: they may be instrumental in commencing
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desist letter, though often a precursor to settlements that stop the
use of intellectual property, and an important step that may help a
plaintiff argue a willful infringement claim in court, has little
judicial backing and may be ignored by an infringer who does not
believe that he is in the wrong. 9 The third option, commencing a
lawsuit, is expensive, time consuming, and unpredictable, as the
case law is still undeveloped and inconsistent due to the fact that
most disputes are resolved using the two alternative courses of
action. 10 Initiating a lawsuit can also bring the issue to the public’s
attention, and generate negative press and a public backlash. 11
These courses of action are typically not mutually exclusive; an
infringed party might report the infringement to the website while
simultaneously sending a cease-and-desist letter to the infringing
party, and subsequently filing a lawsuit. 12
None of these three options provide a complete solution to the
problem—the problem being a lack of a clear and transparent
solution for solving intellectual property disputes on social media
websites. 13 So even though a social media site taking down the
infringing material or a court awarding damages and/or an
injunction “solves the problem” on a fundamental level—as the
copyright/trademark holder is granted relief—this fails to solve the
problem that this paper seeks to address. A complete solution to the
problem would grant proper relief while also being cost effective,
timely, and completely transparent throughout the whole process of
granting relief.

settlement negotiations or serve as an impetus for licensing discussions; in
patent cases they may trigger the filing of reexamination requests or
declaratory judgment actions and assist in eliminating ‘bad’ patents from some
of the overpatented fields of technology. Letters may also mobilize their
addressees to take steps in preparation for a potential lawsuit and initiate
development of alternative brands, products, and design-around technologies.”).
9. I Received a Letter/Email . . . USPTO (Sept. 26, 2014),
www.uspto.gov/trademark/i-received-letter (stating that someone who receives
a cease-and-desist letter “may elect not to respond to the letter/email or any
follow-up letters/emails”).
10. See Darin M. Klemchuk & Roxana Sullivan, Brand Enforcement on
Social
Networking
Sites,
A.B.A.,
http://apps.american ba
r.org/litigation/committees/commercial/articles/092410-klemchuk-sullivan-soci
al-networking-brand-enforcement.html (mentioning that “[c]ase law pertainin g
to trademark infringement on social networking sites is sparse. Most cases
settle early or are resolved through dispute resolution mechanisms within the
social networking website.”).
11. See Thomas & Newman, supra note 5. For example, Barbara Streisan d
sued a website after finding out that it had posted pictures of her house as part
of an environmental survey. See id. The website had only a few views prior to
Stresiand commencing the lawsuit against the website; however, the view count
surpassed one million as news of the lawsuit increase d its publicity. See id.
12. See id. (describing how an IP owner can report the infringement directly
to the social media website, and can also take more aggressive steps such as
“sending a cease and desist letter to the account holder, or even filing suit”).
13. For a more in depth analysis of this problem, see infra Part II.
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In response to this problem, the notion of creating a fourth
solution has emerged. 14 This possible fourth solution is to develop a
Uniform Social Media Intellectual Property Dispute Resolution
Policy (USRP) and to create the system to administer this
mechanism. 15 Similar to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy that has been effective in providing a timely and
inexpensive solution to domain name squatters, the USRP would
provide a private third-party mechanism for the resolution of
intellectual property disputes stemming from the use of social
media websites. 16 Users would be contractually obligated to submit
to this system when they agree to the terms and conditions of the
social media sites. 17 This comment will discuss the viability of such
an option, and whether the creation of a USRP is desirable or even
attainable.
In Part I, this comment will discuss the different types of
intellectual property issues that can arise on social media websites.
Part II will then discuss the three actions currently available to an
infringed owner attempting to protect its intellectual property
rights. Part III will discuss the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP), a successful mechanism for resolving
domain name disputes online. Finally, Part IV will discuss the
possible creation of a USRP, which will be modeled after the UDRP,
in which a private third-party arbitrator would resolve intellectual
property disputes in the social media arena. This section will debate
the viability and desirability of such an option, keeping in mind the
need to balance fairness, accuracy in decisions, consistency, cost,
and time. This comment will conclude that a USRP, while
attainable, is not desirable. Instead, as Part V will discuss, social
media websites should play the primary role in regulating social
media intellectual property disputes. This comment argues that the
best solution to this problem is for social media websites to change
their regulations by making their policies more cohesive and
coherent, and their takedown requests and decisions more
transparent.
14. McGrady proposed a Social Media Username Dispute Resolution Policy
that was limited to username squatting disputes; however, there has never been
a proposed uniform mechanism that would address all intellectual property
disputes that arise on social media websites. See MCG RADY, supra note 1, at §
12.07.
15. For an in depth discussion on this possible fourth solution and the
positives and negatives of such a solution, see infra Part IV.
16. See Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN (Jan. 16, 2016),
www.icann.org/resources/pages/dndr-2012-02-25-en#udrp
(describing
the
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy); Jacqueline D. Lipton ,
Celebrity in Cyberspace: A Personality Rights Paradigm for Personal Domain
Name Disputes, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV . 1445, 1456 (2008) (stating that the
“UDRP is the simplest and most cost-effective procedural avenue for” celebritie s
who have been cyber squatted).
17. For a discussion on how users would be contractually obligated to submit
to the USRP, see infra note 298, and accompanying text.
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II. I NTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES I N SOCIAL MEDIA
This part discusses the different types of intellectual property
issues that can arise on social media websites. First, it will examine
trademark law, and a unique subset of trademark law—usernam e
squatting—that frequently appears on social media websites. It will
then address the topic of copyright law, giving a brief background
on the law and discussing various ways that copyright infringement
arises on social media websites.

A. Trademarks
Trademark infringement is a major issue on social media
websites. 18 A trademark is a “word, name, symbol, or device” that
identifies a particular source of goods or services and distinguishes
them from other goods and services. 19 Trademark law can also
extend to product features such as colors, sounds, and even the
layout of a retail store. 20 Whereas copyright law encourages creative
efforts, trademark law was created to protect consumers from
source confusion and to incentivize businesses to create quality
products by ensuring that their mark’s goodwill is protected. 21
Trademarks are governed by both state law and by federal law
under the Lanham Act. 22 Three elements are required for a valid

18. See Dan Malachowski, “Username Jacking” In Social Media: Should
Celebrities And Brand Owners Recover From Social Networkin g Sites When
Their Social Media Usernames Are Stolen?, 60 DE PAUL L. REV . 223, 227–28
(2010) (providing an expansive list of people whose names have been username
squatted on social media).
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2016) (“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . .”); ANNE G ILSON
LALONDE & JEROME G ILSON, 1 G ILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.03 (Matthew
Bender & Co. 2015).
20. See id. at § 1.02(1)(a) (“Trademarks can consist of almost any conceivable
subject matter, from a word, symbol, picture, design, numeral, escutcheon,
monogram, abbreviation, acronym, slogan, personal name, phrase, newspaper
or magazine column title, title of a book series, fragrance, color, sound, texture,
container, packaging, product shape, building shape, sales technique, telephone
number, geographical name, grade designation, celebrity persona or any
combination of these.”).
21. Id. at § 1.03. For example, Rolex has been granted a trademark for its
name not because allowing competitors to use the mark would be unfair to
Rolex, but rather, because allowing a competitor’s watch to bear the insignia
would confuse consumers about which company created the watch. See id.
22. Id. at § 1.04. However, while federal registration provides certain
benefits, such registration is not required to have a legally recognized
trademark. Id.
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trademark: (1) first use in commerce, 23 (2) distinctiveness, 24 and (3)
non-functionality. 25 To prove trademark infringement, the plaintiff
must show that it has a valid trademark, and that the defendant,
without consent, used the mark in commerce “in connection with
[the] goods or services” in a manner “likely to cause confusion . . . or
to deceive [consumers].”26

23. A mark must be the first of its kind used in commerce. Id. The Supreme
Court has stated that “the right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not
its mere adoption.” United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97
(1918). Therefore, a mark first used in a particular geographic region obtains
the right to be used and protected in that region. Id.
24. To satisfy the distinctiveness requirement, a mark must distinguish
goods offered by one company from goods offered by another company within
the same sector. See G ILSON ET AL., supra note 19, at § 2.01. Distinctiveness is
typically looked at as a spectrum with multiple levels of distinctiveness. Id. A
fanciful mark is the strongest type of mark, and is typically a made up word.
Daniel A. Tysver, Strength of Trademarks, BITLAW, www.bitlaw
.com/trademark/degrees.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). For example, “Kodak”
and “Exxon” had never been found in a dictionary before their inception as
trademarks. Id. Next, an arbitrary mark is typically a word that has meaning
elsewhere, but not in relation to the goods or services being used. Id. For
example, “apple” has long been used to describe a fruit and “camel” has long
been used to describe an animal, but these words have become arbitrary marks
in the computer and tobacco industry. Id. Following that, a suggestive mark
indicates to a consumer the nature of a good through a sudden leap in thought.
Id. For example, the name “airbus” suggests to consumers that the company
behind the mark might be an airplane company, but the consumer must make
an inferential leap to come to that conclusion. Id. Finally, a descriptive mark is
the weakest kind of mark, and merely describes the good or service. Id. An
example of this would be “outback steakhouse.” Id. A descriptive mark has no
trademark protection unless it has acquired secondary meaning in the market,
which means that consumers associate the mark with the specific goods or
services. Id. Further, a word or phrase that was once distinctive can lose its
trademark status if it loses its secondary meaning and becomes generic. Id. So
while “aspirin” and “thermos” were once protected by trademark, their meaning
has become generic over the years and they have lost their trademark status.
Id.; see also Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding
that “aspirin” has become generic); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus.,
321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that “thermos” has become generic). Marks
can also be born generic. See G ILSON ET AL., supra note 19, at § 2.02(5).
25. The mark must be non-functional. See TrafFix Devices v. Mktg.
Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001). Patent law governs functional produ ct
features. Id. The Ninth Circuit has employed a four-factor test to determine
whether a certain trade dress is functional: “(1) whether the design yields a
utilitarian advantage, (2) whether alternative designs are available, (3)
whether advertising touts the utilitarian advantages of the design, and (4)
whether the particular design results from a comparatively simple or
inexpensive method of manufacture.” See Disc Golf Ass'n v. Champion Discs,
158 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1998). For example, a pharmace utical pill
capsule’s blue-red color could be found functional (and the capsule would
therefore not be trademarkable) due to the fact that it reduces the patient’s
anxiety and confusion, and can help the physicians determine which drug was
taken in the case of an overdose. See Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844,
862–63 (1982).
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2016) (“Any person who, on or in connection
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In addition to suing for trademark infringement, a plaintiff can
sue an infringer for trademark dilution. 27 Under federal dilution
law, famous trademarks are protected “from unauthorized uses that
are likely to impair their distinctiveness or harm their reputation”
by blurring or tarnishing the marks, even without any likelihood of
confusion. 28 For example, even though “The Polo Club” adult
entertainment store might not confuse the average consumer and
cause him or her to wonder about whether it is associated with the
design company “Polo Ralph Lauren,” it might tarnish the Polo
with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which— (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval
of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B)
in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s
goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”);
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2016) (“Any person who shall, without the consent of the
registrant—(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered
mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements
intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering
for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided.”). Likelihood of confusion is different than actual confusion, and
courts typically use a factors test to determine whether there is a likelihood of
confusion. See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding that “[i]n determining whether confusion between related goods
is likely, the following factors are relevant: (1) strength of the mark; (2)
proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual
confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care
likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant's intent in selecting the
mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines”).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2016) (stating that “the owner of a famous
mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness,” can be
granted an injunction “against another person who, at any time after the
owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in
commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishmen t
of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely
confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury”); see also G ILSON ET AL.,
supra note 19, at § 5A.01.
28. See G ILSON ET AL., supra note 19, at § 5A.01. The Statute itself defines
“Dilution by blurring” as the “association arising from the similarity between a
mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the
famous mark,” and “dilution by tarnishment” as the “association arising from
the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms
the reputation of the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B), (C) (2016).
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Ralph Lauren brand. 29 Trademark dilution protects owners from
others seeking to reap free benefit from the owner’s good will and
investment in that mark. 30 There are, however, statutory
exemptions to trademark dilution. 31 Comparative advertising, news
reporting and commentary, criticizing and parodying, and
noncommercial use are all affirmative defenses to a claim of
trademark dilution. 32
Additionally, a party can be liable for contributory
infringement if it induces or knowingly facilitates another party’s
infringement. 33 Courts have held that Internet service providers
can be liable for contributory infringement when they host a website
on which a third-party publishes infringing material. 34 However,
courts have limited the potential liability to instances in which an
Internet service provider has “[d]irect control and monitoring of the
29. See Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman, No. H-97-18551998, U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5890, at *16 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 1998) (holding that defendants’ use of
“The Polo Club” and use of the Polo player symbol trademark in his adult
entertainment club tarnished the Polo Ralph Lauren trademark). Polo Ralph
Lauren is a brand owned by Ralph Lauren Corporation, a global leader in design
and marketing. Company Profile, RALPH LAUREN, http://investor.ralphlauren.
com/phoenix.zhtml?c=65933&p=irol-irhome (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). Ralph
Lauren Corporation sells high quality apparel and accessory products. See id.
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2016); G ILSON ET AL., supra note 19, at § 5A.01
(stating that “[d]ilution law . . . protects only a private interest, and a narrow
one at that: the distinctiveness and reputation of famous trademarks. At least
in cases where there is no simultaneous likelihood of confusion, there is no
identifiable benefit to the public”).
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2016).
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2016) (“The following shall not be actionable
as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection: (A)Any
fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such
fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of
source for the person’s own goods or services, including use in connection with —
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or
services; or (ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the
famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner. (B) All
forms of news reporting and news commentary. (C) Any noncommercial use of
a mark.”).
33. See G ILSON ET AL., supra note 19, at § 11.02; see also Inwood Labs. v.
Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 853–54 (1982) (noting “liability for trademark
infringement can extend beyond those who actually mislabel goods with the
mark of another. Even if a manufacturer does not directly control others in the
chain of distribution, it can be held responsible for their infringing activitie s
under certain circumstances. Thus, if a manufacturer or distributo r
intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to
supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in
trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorily
responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.”).
34. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980,
984–85 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that an internet service provider could fall under
the Inwood test for contributory infringement liability, but holding that the
Defendant Network Solutions was not liable for contributory infringement in
the instant case because the service did not entail “the kind o f direct control and
monitoring required” for such liability).
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instrumentality used by a third party to infringe the plaintiff’ s
mark,” yet still fails to do anything about the infringing material. 35
In Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., for example, Tiffany, the jewelry
retailer, claimed that eBay was liable under a theory of contributory
trademark infringement because eBay “fail[ed] to take adequate
steps” to stop the infringement and “allowed repeat offenders to sell
counterfeit goods” even after Tiffany filed a notice of infringement
through the website. 36 However, eBay claimed that it immediately
removed the offered listings upon receipt of the infringement
claim. 37 The court refused to hold eBay liable for contributory
infringement, stating that “eBay cannot be held liable for
trademark infringement based solely on [its] generalized knowledge
that trademark infringement might be occurring on [its]
websites.”38 Here, eBay took appropriate steps and pulled listings
after it became aware of the infringement. 39 However, had eBay not
taken the appropriate steps, it might have been liable for
contributory infringement. 40
In addition to traditional trademark infringement and
contributory infringement, username squatting is a type of
trademark infringement that commonly occurs on social media
websites. 41 Username squatting in the social media arena, also

35. Id. at 984.
36. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 516 (S.D.N.Y .
2008). Tiffanny & Co. is a jewelry empire that was started in 1837 in New York.
See
About
Tiffany &
Co., TIFFANY&CO.,
http://press.tiffany.co m
/ViewBackgrounder.aspx?backgrounderId=33 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
Tiffany & Co. is known for its exquisite design, diamonds, and gems. See id.
Tiffany & Co. has even been commissioned by the National Football League to
create the Vince Lombardi Trophy for the Super Bowl Championship. See id.
37. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 469. EBay did not flat out
contend that it removed the content, but rather stated that it is eBay’s practice
to remove infringing content. Id. (“eBay claims that in practice, when
potentially infringing listings were reported to eBay, eBay immediate ly
removed the offending listings.”). EBay is an online third-party auction retailer
that sells anything from baseballs to luxury cars. Who We Are, EBAY ,
www.ebayinc.com/our-company/who-we-are/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). EBay
has 159 million active buyers and 800 million live listings. Id. EBay is a top 10
global retail brand with buyers in 190 countries. Id.
38. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d. at 527. With over 800 million live
listings, it is no wonder the court determined that eBay had only a generalized
knowledge of infringement on its website. See E BAY, supra note 37.
39. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 517.
40. See id. This is because, as stated earlier, courts have limited contributory
infringement liability to instances in which an Internet service provider has
“[d]irect control and monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to
infringe the plaintiff’s mark,” yet still fails to do anything about the infringing
material. See Lockheed Martin Corp., 194 F.3d at 984–85; see also G ILSON ET
AL., supra note 19, at § 11.02; see also Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 853–54.
41. See Malachowski, supra note 18, at 227–28 (providing an expansive list
of people whose names have been username squatted on social media).
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referred to as cybersquatting, 42 social squatting, 43 brandjacking, 44
or twitterjacking, 45 occurs when a person registers a celebrity or
company’s name with the bad faith intention of benefiting from the
goodwill of that established name or trademark. 46 The names of
celebrities can be protected by trademark, and social media
websites usually ban impersonation in addition to trademark
violations. 47 Many celebrities, both reviled and revered, such as
Christopher Walken, Condoleezza Rice, Bill Gates, and even Osama
bin Laden, have been twitterjacked. 48 At one point, a fake Peyton
Manning Twitter account had 10,848 followers, while a fake Eli
Manning account had 17,084 followers. 49 Two cases of usernam e

42. Zorik Pesochinsky, Almost Famous: Preventing Username-Squatting on
Social Networking Websites, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 223, 224 (2010).
43. 3 JAMES B. ASTRACHAN, DONNA THOMAS , G EORGE ERIC ROSDEN &
PETER ERIC ROSDEN, THE LAW OF ADVERTISING § 56.05 (Matthew Bender & Co.
2015).
44. See also Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Trademark
Infringement by Impersonation of Markholders, 58 BUFF. L. REV . 851, 855
(2010).
45. Jillian Bluestone, La Russa's Loophole: Trademark Infringement
Lawsuits And Social Networks, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 573, 573 n.5 (2010).
46. See Pesochinsky, supra note 42, at 224 (defining username squatting as
“the badfaith registration of a personal name, other than the registrant’s, as a
username on a social networking website”). Note that my definition includes the
additional requirement that the username squatter intend to benefit from the
goodwill of the established name or mark.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2016) (noting that a person can be held liable
for registering, trafficking, or using a domain name that is similar to a
trademark owned by somebody else). It is important to note that the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) only applies to domain
name squatting, and does not apply to username squatting. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)
(2016). For a discussion on the varying social media policies, including whether
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube ban impersonation in addition to trademark
infringement, see infra Part III(A).
48. See Joshua Rhett Miller, “Twitterjacking” - Identity Theft in 140
Characters or Less, Fox News (May 1, 2009), www.foxnews.com
/story/0,2933,518480,00.h tml.
49. Tony La Russa Settles Lawsuit Against Twitter Out of Court, STREET &
SMITH'S
SPORTS
BUS .
DAILY
(June
8,
2009),
www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/130769. Peyton Manning is a quarterback
in the National Football League who has won the league’s most valuable player
award a record-breaking five times. Chris Wesseling, Peyton Manning is MVP
of
NFL
for
Record
Fifth
Time,
NFL.COM
(Feb.
1,
2014),
www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap2000000321598/article/peyton-manning- is-mvpof-nfl-for-record-fifth-time. He also holds the NFL record for most passin g
touchdowns in a career, most passing touchdowns in a season, and most passin g
yards in a season. James Dator, Here's a List of Every Major NFL Record Peyton
Manning Holds, SB NATION (Oct. 19, 2014), www.sbnation.com/nfl
/2014/10/19/7010081/peyton-manning-nfl-record-list-most-touchdowns-509. Eli
Manning, Peyton’s younger brother, is in his eleventh season as the New York
Giant’s quarterback. Dan Hanzus, Eli Manning Signs 4-year, $84M Extension
with Giants, NFL.COM (Sept. 11 2015), www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap30000
00525338/article/eli-mann ing-giants-agree-on-4year-84m-extension.
In
response to the fake Twitter account, Eli Manning stated: “I haven’t gotten hurt
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squatting in particular, however, are of particular note due to the
fact that the infringed party initiated a lawsuit against Twitter
instead of the username squatter. 50
In LaRussa v. Twitter, Tony La Russa, the then-manager of the
St. Louis Cardinals’ major league baseball team, sued Twitter for
trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and cybersquatting,
among other claims. 51 La Russa’s complaint arose after an
anonymous user created a fake Twitter profile using the “Tony La
Russa” Twitter handle and a picture of La Russa with his name next
to it. 52 The fake La Russa page contained a statement in large
lettering that read, “Tony La Russa is using Twitter,” and
encouraged users to “Join today to start receiving Tony La Russa’s
updates.”53 The page also contained a message that read “Bio
Parodies are fun for everyone.”54
La Russa claims he informed Twitter about the impersonating
account, and that Twitter ignored his complaints. 55 This set the
table for the first ever lawsuit against Twitter. 56 In his complaint,
by it. But it was important for Peyton and I to get it out there that we’re not on
Twitter. We won't be using it. So if anybody gets a message saying it’s from Eli
or Peyton, it’s not us.” See Sports Media, supra note 49.
50. Compl. for Trademark Infringement, False Designation of Origin,
Trademark Dilution, Cybersquatting, Misappropriation of Name, and
Misappropriation of Likeness, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. 09-488101 (Cal.
Super. Ct. filed May 06, 2009); Compl., Oneok, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-00597-TCK TLW.
51. La Russa also sued Twitter for false designation of origin,
misappropriation of name, misappropriation of likeness, invasion of privacy,
and intentional misrepresentation. Compl. for Trademark Infringement, False
Designation of Origin, Trademark Dilution, Cybersquatting, Misappropriatio n
of Name, and Misappropriation of Likeness, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. 09488101 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 06, 2009).
52. Id. at *3. La Russa’s days as a baseball player were marred with injury,
and he retired from the league following the 1977 season with a meager .199
career batting average. Tony La Russa, NAT’L BASEBALL HALL OF FAME ,
http://baseballhall.org/hof/larussa-tony (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). La Russa
enrolled in law school during the 1973 offseason, and graduated from Florida
State University in 1978. Id. He passed the Florida state bar the following year.
Id. However, La Russa forewent a career in law to manage baseball. Id. At the
age of 35, La Russa became the youngest manager in baseball when he managed
the Chicago White Sox. Id. In addition to managing the Chicago White Sox, La
Russa went on to manage the Oakland Athletics and the St. Louis Cardinals.
See id. As a manager, La Russa won 2,728 games and three World Series
championships. Id. He was inducted into the National Baseball Hall of Fame in
2014. Id.
53. Compl. for Trademark Infringement, False Designation of Origin,
Trademark Dilution, Cybersquatting, Misappropriation of Name, and
Misappropriation of Likeness, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. 09-488101, at *3
(Cal. Sup. Ct. filed May 06, 2009).
54. Id. at Ex. A.
55. Zusha Elinson, Twitter Says It Will Fight La Russa Suit Over Fake
Tweets, THE RECORDER, June 9, 2009, at 1.
56. Id.; Bluestone, supra note 45, at 593 (stating “[i]n the first ever lawsuit
against Twitter, La Russa raised a variety of claims.”).
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La Russa alleged that the fake La Russa page contained “written
entries that are impliedly written by [La Russa] himself when in
fact they are not.”57 The complaint further alleged that allowing
another user to use the “Tony La Russa” username was “misleading
and likely to confuse users by leading them to believe that [the page]
is endorsed and authored by” the real Tony La Russa. 58 Shortly
thereafter, La Russa voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit, and Twitter
removed the infringing account and its postings. 59
Fewer than three months after La Russa dismissed his lawsuit,
Twitter was faced with a similar suit filed by Oneok, Inc. 60 In Oneok,
Inc. v. Twitter, Oneok, a publically traded fortune 500 company,
sued Twitter for direct and contributory trademark infringement. 61
Oneok’s complaint arose after a third-party registered the “Oneok”
Twitter handle and used the account to send Tweets about the
company. 62 In its complaint, Oneok alleged that “[t]he Oneok
Twitter account holder has on at least two occasions generated
Tweets containing information regarding Oneok, Inc.,” that “[t]hese
communications contained the Oneok trademark name and
Diamond design,” and that “[t]hese Tweets have the appearance of
being an official statement issued by Oneok on the Twitter
system.”63 The complaint also alleged that Twitter refused to
provide Oneok with the contact information of the infringed account
holder, and that Twitter refused to assign the Oneok Twitter
account to Oneok, Inc. 64 Within 24 hours after the complaint was
submitted, Twitter suspended the impersonating account, and
Oneok withdrew the lawsuit. 65
In the aftermath of these two lawsuits, Twitter started
allowing celebrities and businesses to authenticate their account by
having Twitter verify the authenticity of the user behind the
account and then publishing a blue check mark insignia on the

57. Complaint., La Russa, No. 09-488101, at *3.
58. Id.
59. Notice of Dismissal, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. 09-2503 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
filed June 5 2009); DMLP Staff, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., DIGITAL MEDIA LAW
PROJECT (May. 20, 2009), www.dmlp.org/threats/la-russa-v-twitter-inc.
60. Notice of Dismissal, La Russa, No. 09-2503; see Complaint., Oneok, Inc.,
No. 4:09-cv-00597-TCK-TLW.
61. Complaint., Oneok, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-00597-TCK-TLW, at *2,4 Oneok,
Inc.
is
a
diversified
energy
company.
About
Us,
O NEOK,
www.oneok.com/en/About (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). It is also the sole general
partner of ONEOK Partners, L.P., owning 41.2%. Id. Oneok Partners, L.P., is a
publicly traded limited partnership that is involved with the gathering and
processing of natural gas, in addition to natural gas pipelines. Id. Oneok is a
fortune 500 company that is listed on Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Index (the
S&P 500). Id.
62. Compl., Oneok, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-00597-TCK-TLW, at *3.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.; DMLP Staff, Oneok, Inc. v. Twitter, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJE CT
(Aug. 20, 2010), www.dmlp.org/threats/oneok-inc-v-twitter#description.
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user’s profile. 66 Facebook adopted a similar policy shortly
thereafter. 67 While this authentication process was able to curtail
some types of username squatting, it has not been a permanent
solution to the problem. 68
An example of a type of username squatting that could not be
prevented by verified accounts recently made national headlines. 69
In August 2015, Target announced that it planned to remove
gender-based labels from some of its store’s departments. 70 Some
outraged customers wanted to complain, so they went onto Target’s
Facebook page to voice their disdain about the newly proposed
policy. 71 Mike Malgaard used this opportunity to pose as Target and
post responses to people’s comments. 72 Malgaard created a fake
account named “Ask ForHelp” that used a picture of Target’s logo
as the account’s picture. 73 In one of its responses, Ask ForHelp said

66. FAQs About Verified Accounts, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.co m
/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/111-features/articles/119135- about-verifie daccounts (last visited Jan. 7, 2016); Craig Kannaley, Why Twitter Verifies Users:
The History Behind the Blue Checkmark, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2013),
www.huffingtonpost.com/craig-kanalley/twitter-verified-accounts_b_2863282.
html (stating that Twitter adopted its verified accounts system after Tony La
Russa was impersonated on Twitter).
67.
Verified
Page
or
Profile,
FACEBOOK,
www.facebook.com
/help/196050490547892 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) (“Some Pages and profiles
have been verified by Facebook to let people know that they're authentic. If you
see a blue badge on a Page or profile, it means that Facebook confirmed that
this is the authentic Page or profile for this public figure, media company or
brand. If you see a gray badge on a Page, it means that Facebook confirmed that
this is an authentic Page for this business or organization.”); Chloe Albanesius,
Facebook Rolls Out Verified Pages, Profiles, PC MAG (May 29, 2013),
www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2419632,00.asp (stating that “Facebook . . .
took a page from Twitter and rolled out verified pages and profiles”).
68. See infra notes 69–74, and accompanying text.
69. Lori Grisham, Fake Target Account Answers Fake Facebook Gripes, USA
TODAY
(Aug.
14,
2015),
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation now/2015/08/14/fake-target-account-answers-facebook-gripes/31706967/.
70. See id. For example, Target planned to no longer make a distinctio n
between “toys for boys” and “toys for girls.” See id. This move towards gender
neutrality has been on the rise lately. See Richard Alleyne, Couple Raise Child
as ‘Gender Neutral’ to Avoid Stereotyping, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 20, 2012),
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/9028479/Couple-raise-child-as-gender-neutral-toavoid-stereotyping.html. For example, Beck Laxton and Kieran Cooper did not
reveal the sex of their child until the child turned five. Id. The couple referred
to their child as “The Infant,” only allowing the child to play with “gender neutral toys” and alternating between boys’ and girls’ clothes. See id.
71. Gisham, supra note 69.
72. Id. Target is a discount retailer that sells food, clothing, games, sports
equipment, and many other products. Corporate Fact Sheet, TARGET ,
https://corporate.target.com/press/corporate (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). Target
has 1,805 stores in the United States, and employs 347,000 people worldwide.
See id. Target’s iconic logo is a red bullseye. See id.
73. See Grisham, supra note 69.
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“[w]e invite you to come separate the toys yourself. We just
personally can't keep doing it anymore. It's a lot of work.”74
These clear acts of username squatting were quickly
frustrated, as the comments were removed from Target’s Facebook
Page within days. 75 However, the incident showed that usernam e
squatting is still prevalent today and emphasized the need for a
lasting and effective solution. Though one could argue that the
takedown procedure worked here, as Facebook removed Malgaard’ s
fake account within days, it is still important to explore other
possible ways to counteract this type of infringement. 76 Despite the
fact that the takedown procedure was quick and effective in this
circumstance, it is important that we do not sacrifice speediness for
fairness in decisions and transparency.

B. Copyrights
In addition to trademark infringement, copyright infringement
is also prevalent on social media websites. 77 A copyright grants the
author of an original work the exclusive right to reproduce,
distribute, publicly perform or display, and prepare derivative
works of the copyrighted material. 78 A “work” is any creative
expression that is “fixed in any tangible medium,” which includes
pictures, images, or videos. 79 Congress was granted the power to
create copyright law in the United States Constitution, and
copyrighted works are typically valid until 70 years after the author
of the work dies. 80 Similar to trademarks, the law will recognize and
74. Id.
75. It is unclear whether Malgaard removed the Ask ForHelp comments
himself, or whether Facebook removed them. Id. Additionally, there is
speculation that Target liked the username squatting in question, as Target
alluded to “trolls” (a name commonly given to mischievous people on the
internet) ruling the world and coming back to Target stores. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Lindy Herman & Sean Lynch, Copyright Infringement Risks On
Social Media, 57 O RANGE COUNTY LAWYER 34, 34 (2015) (stating that “[e]very
day, Pinterest users ‘pin’ third-party images to their ‘boards,’ Instagrammers
post or repost others’ images, Redditors recycle content, and bloggers grab thirdparty content off the Internet to illustrate their dialogue. Though it may seem
harmless, many social media users are unaware that these seemingly benign
activities may amount to copyright infringement”).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) – (6) (2016).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2016).
80. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (stating Congress shall “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries”). Typically, any copyright in a work created on or after January 1,
1978 is valid until 70 years after the author’s death. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (a) (2016).
However, in “the case of an anonymous work, a pseudonymous work, or a work
made for hire, the copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its
first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever
expires first.” 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2016).
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protect unregistered copyrights; however, a domestic author must
register its copyright before suing. 81
To have a valid copyright, three requirements must be met: (1)
originality, 82 (2) work of authorship, 83 and (3) fixation. 84 To win a
copyright infringement lawsuit, the plaintiff must prove: (1) that it
owns a valid copyright, and (2) that the defendant copied
“constituent elements of the work that are original.” 85 Because it is
difficult to establish copying as a factual matter (there typically is
not a witness who can attest to the physical act of copying), copying
is often established indirectly through evidence of the plaintiff’ s
access to the copyrighted work, and through “substantial” similarity
of the works in question. 86
Accusations of copyright infringement are common on social
media. 87 For example, earlier this year, Wisconsin-based
photographer Jennifer Reilly sued Twitter for failing to remove her
copyrighted photographs despite her multiple requests that it do
so. 88 In a complaint filed on January 11, 2016, in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California, Reilly claimed
that her copyrighted photo “Red Lips and Microphone” was modified
and posted to Twitter by a University of North Texas student

81. About Copyright: Purpose of Copyright, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CTR.,
www.copyright.com/learn/about-copyright/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
82. The originality requirement is satisfied if the work is creative and is
created independent of another source. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016).
83. Congress has given courts some guidance in determining whether the
work of authorship requirement is satisfied. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)–(8)
(2016). This element encompasses “literary works (including computer
programs), musical works, dramatic works, pantomimes and choreographic
work, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, sound recordings, and architectural works.” 17 U.S.C. §
102(a)(1)–(8) (2016). These categories are merely illustrative and are not all
encompassing. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)–(8) (2016).
84. The fixation element is satisfied if a work is written, recorded, or
otherwise fixed in a tangible medium. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2016). Thus, a piece
of work must be “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016).
85. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361
(citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548
(1985)) (holding that the information contained in Rural’s phonebook was not
copyrightable because it was merely fact information without a requisite
minimum of original creativity).
86. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIG HT
§ 13.01 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2015).
87. See Herman & Lynch, supra note 77, at 35–36 (2015) (providin g
examples in which copyright owners accuse social media users of copyright
infringement).
88. Michael Zang, Photographer Sues Twitter for Not Removing Photos
Despite DMCA Requests, PETAPIXEL (Jan. 16, 2016), http://petapixel.co m
/2016/01/16/photographer-sues-twitter-for-not-removing-photos-despite-dmcarequests/.
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group. 89 The image, which Reilly was selling as a fine art print, was
retweeted by supporters of the group without her permission. 90
After discovering that her photograph was being posted without her
consent, Reilly alleged she sent Twitter 28 takedown requests. 91
Although Twitter removed some of the images, 50 of the 56
infringing posts were not removed. 92 Reilly then sued Twitter for
both direct and contributory copyright infringement. 93 Reilly
voluntarily dismissed the action the following month. 94
But was Twitter really in the wrong? Did the posts actually
infringe on Reilly’s copyrighted work, or were the student group’s
modifications to the photograph sufficient to qualify for the fair use
defense? The fair use doctrine is one defense to copyright
infringement that allows for the unauthorized use of a copyrighted
work even without the owner’s permission. 95 Fair use of a
copyrighted work “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching . . ., scholarship, or research,” is not copyright
infringement. 96 When determining whether certain use of a
copyrighted work constitutes fair use, courts implement a four factor test that weighs:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work. 97
Due to the nature of social media websites as a platform for
“commentary,” users accused of copyright infringement often argue
89. Compl. for Copyright Infringement, Rondinelli Reilly v. Twitter, Inc. et
al, No. 2:16-cv-00200, at *3, Exhibit B (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2016).
90. See Zang, supra note 88.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Compl. Reilly , at *4.
94. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Rondinelli Reilly v. Twitter, Inc. et
al, No. 2:16-cv-00200 (filed Feb. 23, 2016). The terms of the settlement are
unknown. See id.
95. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2016).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2016) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, includin g
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”).
97. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2016).
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that they are protected by the fair use doctrine. 98 For example, in
2013, to commemorate the twelfth anniversary of 9/11, Fox News
posted on its Facebook account an image of three firefighters
hoisting an American flag at the ruins of the World Trade Center
site on the day of the attacks. 99 This image was juxtaposed with the
iconic World War II photograph of four United States marines
hoisting the American flag on Iwo Jima, and was posted to the
Facebook page with the hashtag “#neverforget.” 100 North Jersey
Media Group, which owns the copyright to the 9/11 picture, sued
Fox News and Jean Pirro, one of Fox News’ television personalities,
for copyright infringement. 101 In its defense, Fox News contended
that its posting of the combined image was protected fair use. 102 Fox
News argued, among other things, that its use of the image was
commentary because it juxtaposed the image with the Iwo Jima
image and also used the hashtag “#neverforget” to signal Fox News’
“participation in an ongoing, global discussion concerning the
events of September 11, 2001.”103 The Court denied Fox news’
motion for summary judgment. 104 The Court held that although
98. See Herman & Lynch, supra note 87, at 36 (discussing the fair use
defense on social media).
99. Eriq Gardner, 9/11 Photos Causing Legal Trouble for Fox News, Other
Media
Outlets,
HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER
(Feb.
12,
2015),
www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/9-11-photos-causing-legal-772735.
Fox
News is a cable television network involved in news and political commentary.
Michael Ray, Fox News Channel, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (updated July 22, 2016),
www.britannica.com/topic/Fox-News-Channel (last visited Jan. 7, 2015). The
network was launched in 1996 under Fox Entertainment Group. See id. Fox
News bills itself as a “fair and balanced” alternative to the other liberal
networks. Id. However, Fox News has heavy conse rvative leanings, as the
network has donated to Republican causes, in addition to forging strong ties
with conservative political leaders. Id.
100. Gardner, supra note 99.
101. N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Jeanine Pirro & Fox News Network, LLC,
74 F. Supp. 3d 605, 609-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). North Jersey Media Group is an
independent, family-owned news and marketing provider in Northern New
Jersey.
About
North
Jersey
Media
Group ,
NORTH
JERSEY,
www.northjersey.com/about-us/north-jersey-media-group-inc-corporate-inform
ation-1.177160 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). The media group has a daily
newspaper that reaches almost a half million daily readers, forty-nine
community newspapers that circulate to 778,000 households, a website that
receives approximately 14 million monthly page views, and a magazine that
reaches 50,000 households. See id.
102. N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d, at 609.
103. Id., at 615.
104. See id. at 623 (“Weighing the results together, in light of the purposes
of copyright, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Defendants’ use
of the Work was fair. Material questions of fact exist concerning the purpose of
the Combined Image’s use, precluding a determination of the first statutory
factor [(the purpose and character of the use)]. The second factor [(the nature of
the work)] weighs in favor of fair use, but that factor is only rarely
determinative and is not so in this case. This third factor ([the amount and
substantiality of the portion used)] is neutral. The fourth and most importan t
factor [(the effect of the use upon the market for or value of the original)] weighs
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some of the fair use factors weighed in favor of Fox News, the
“fourth and most important factor”—the effect of the use upon the
market for or value of the original work—weighed against fair
use. 105 Fox News immediately appealed this decision, but later
withdrew the appeal after it entered into a settlement agreement
with North Jersey Media Group. 106
When a dispute goes to court and the defense raises the fair
use doctrine, one can be sure that the court will adequately address
that doctrine. 107 However, it is unclear whether the social media

against fair use . . . Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
must be denied.”).
105. Id.
106. Bill Donahue, Fox News Settles Fair Use Case Over 9/11 Faceboo k
Photo, LAW360 (Apr. 15, 2015), www.law360.com/articles/643460/fox-ne w ssettles-fair-use-case-over-9-11-facebook-photo. Photographs are not the only
copyright issues that arise on social media. See Dante D’Orazio, Twitter is
Deleting Stolen Jokes on Copyright Grounds, VERGE (July 25, 2015, 10:35AM) ,
www.theverge.com/2015/7/25/9039127/twitter-deletes-sto len-joke-dmcatakedown. In particular, Twitter is deleting stolen jokes on copyright grounds.
For example, Instagram and Twitter celebrity Josh Ostrovsky, known to his
followers as “The Fat Jew” recently found himself at the center of a media frenzy
over allegations of copyright infringement. Oliver Herzfeld, The Fat Jew,
Plagiarism
and
Copyright
Law,
FORBES
(Aug.
24,
2015),
www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/2015/08/24/the-fat-jew-plagiarism-andcopyright-law/. Ostrovsky, who made TIME’s 2015 list of the thirty most
influential people on the Internet, reached fame-level status by posting comedic
images and jokes on his Instagram account. Time Staff, The 30 Most Influential
People on the Internet, TIME (Mar. 5, 2015), http://time.com/3732203/the - 30most-influential-people-on-the-internet/.
People
accused Ostrovsky
of
deliberately stealing jokes without attributing them to the original creator. See
Herzfeld, supra note 106. Facebook user Maura Quint stated that “The Fat Jew
is someone whose entire career is simply stealing jokes from [T]umblr,
[T]witter, etc. He is making a living off of the hard work of other people . . . .”
Nolan Feeney, ‘The Fat Jew’ Is Being Called Out for Plagiarism After Talent
Deal, TIME (Aug. 17, 2015), http://time.com/4000711/fat-jew-back lash/. On one
occasion, for example, Ostrovsky Tweeted, verbatim and without attribution, a
joke that Matt Besser, the Upright Citizens Brigade Improvisation Theatre’s
co-founder, had Tweeted years earlier. Jesse David Fox, A Conversation with
The Fat Jew: “That’s Not Who I Am or What I’m About,” VULTURE (Aug. 21,
2015),
www.vulture.com/2015/08/exclusive-interview-the-fat-jew.html.
On
another occasion, Ostrovsky posted an exact copy of an image with caption to
Instagram that comedian Ben Rosen had posted to Twitter, the only change was
that Ostrovsky cropped out Rosen’s name, face, and Twitter handle. Jason
Newman, ‘The Fat Jew’ Joke Victims Speak Out, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 20,
2015),
www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/the -fat-jew-joke-theft-victimsspeak-out-20150820. While none of the original content creators took any
formal legal action, public outcry was overwhelming and television network
Comedy Central scrapped a deal it had in the works with Ostrovsky. See
Herzfeld, supra note 106. In response, Ostrovsky has pledged to “never again
post something that doesn’t have attribution,” stating that he “now realize[s]
that if [he] couldn't find a source for something, [he] probably shouldn't have
posted it in the first place.” Fox, supra note 106.
107. See NIMMER, supra note 86, at § 12B.01 (discussing numerous
contributory infringement cases in which courts analyzed the fair use doctrine).
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websites balance these factors upon receipt of a takedown request
and before deciding whether to remove content. 108 Social media
websites offer a speedy resolution, but it is important that they not
sacrifice fairness and accuracy in decisions as a result. 109
The discussion thus far has, for the most part, addressed
copyright liability for a party that posts infringing material. But
what about the social media website that unknowingly hosts that
infringing material? In addition to suing the infringing party, the
holder of a valid copyright can sue a third party that materially
contributes to the infringement under the law of contributory
infringement. 110 In Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., the Supreme Court held that “one who distributes a device
with the objective of promoting its use to infringe [a] copyright . . .
is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. ” 111
This case, adapted to the social media arena, stands for the
proposition that a social media website can be held liable for
inducing infringement by its users. 112 That is, unless it implements
a system that satisfies Congress’ safe harbor provision. 113
In 1998, Congress created a safe harbor for Internet service
providers that take certain precautions against copyright
infringement by their users. 114 The Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) shields a website from copyright liability, but only if it
takes certain steps to block or remove the allegedly infringing
material after being notified of such infringement by the copyright
holder. 115 A website can escape liability for any infringing material
posted to its website by a third-party if it is unaware of such
infringing material or if, “upon notification of [the] claimed
infringement,” the website “responds expeditiously to remove, or
108. For a discussion on the various social media policies, see infra Part
II(A).
109. For a discussion on the various social media policies, see infra Part
II(A).
110. See generally MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) .
In that case, the Court unanimously held that Grokster and Streamcast, two
peer-to-peer file sharing companies that distributed file sharing software that
encouraged users to download and upload copyrighted works, could be sued for
inducing copyright infringement. See id. at 919–24, 941.
111. Id. at 919.
112. Jacqueline C. Charlesworth, The Moral of the Story: What Grokster Has
to Teach About the DMCA, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV . 6 (2011).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2016). See also Charlesworth, supra note 112, at ¶1.
114. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2016).
115. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2016). The DMCA fills certain holes left by the
1995 Communications Decency Act (CDA). 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2016). The CDA
protects online service providers from tort liability for content posted by third
party users. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2016). The CDA stipulates that “[n]o provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2016). The CDA, however, failed to provide Internet
service providers with immunity from copyright or trademark infringement. See
id.
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disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to
be the subject of infringing activity.” 116 Additionally, a service
provider must “[adopt] and reasonably implement[] . . . a policy that
provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of
subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or
network who are repeat infringers.” 117 In short, a website will be
protected from liability if it implements a policy against copyright
infringement, advertises that policy to its users, and makes
reasonable efforts to remove the infringing material after being
made aware of it. 118
Viacom Inc. v. YouTube, Google Inc., provides an example of a
website that successfully used the DMCA’s safe harbor provision to
shield itself from liability. 119 In this 2012 case, Viacom sued
YouTube for copyright infringement, alleging that YouTube
intentionally made 79,000 unauthorized Viacom clips available to
the public between 2005 and 2008. 120 In its defense, YouTube relied
on the DMCA’s safe harbor provision. 121 The District Court agreed,
granting summary judgment for YouTube and rejecting the notion

116. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2016) (“A service provider shall not be liable for
monetary relief, or, except as provided [in a different subsection], for injunctive
or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage
at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network
controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider —
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the
material on the system or network is infringing; (ii) in the absence of such actua l
knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity
is apparent; or (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; (B) does not receive
a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in
which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3),
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.”).
117. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2016).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2016). This is likely why websites have certain internal
procedures and takedown policies. However, there is no evidence that this one
factor is the sole reason for self-regulation. It is likely that there are multiple
factors that can be attributed to why websites regulate. For example, websites
may also ban infringement because they want to protect their users from
confusing uses of trademarks and/or because they believe in the protection of
copyrights to encourage the creation of creative works.
119. See generally Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir.
2012).
120. See id. at 25–26. Viacom is a New York company that owns Paramoun t
movie studio as well as cable networks such as Comedy Central, MTV, and
Nickelodeon. See Jonathan Stemple, Google, Viacom Settle Landmark YouTube
Lawsuit, REUTERS (Mar, 18, 2014), www.reuters.com/article/us-google-viacomlawsuit-idUSBREA2H11220140318. In this billion dollar lawsuit against
YouTube, Viacom alleged that YouTube committed copyright infringement by
allowing third-party users to post clips from “The Daily Show with Jon
Stewart,” “South Park,” “SpongeBob SquarePants,” and other programs. Id.
121. Viacom, 676 F.3d, at 25.
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that YouTube engaged in copyright infringement. 122 On appeal, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that though YouTube could
not be held liable based merely on its “generalized awareness of
infringement,” Viacom had provided enough evidence to warrant a
trial. 123 On remand, the District Court affirmed its original
judgment by granting summary judgment for YouTube. 124 The court
opined that YouTube was not “willfully blind,” nor was there any
“evidence that YouTube induced its users to submit infringing
videos, provided users with detailed instructions about what
content to upload or edited their content, prescreened submissions
for quality, steered users to infringing videos, or otherwise
interacted with infringing users to a point where it might be said to
have participated in their infringing activity.” 125
The DMCA safe harbor provision is a driving force behind the
internal policies created by the various social media websites. As
will be discussed below, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube have all

122. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (S.D.N.Y .
2010).
123. See Viacom Int'l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 25–26.
124. See Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc, 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 121–23. The
case was settled before further appeal commenced. See Stemple, supra note 120.
125. Id. at 123. Whereas the court was quick to reject a contributory
infringement claim against YouTube because YouTube had no “knowledge or
awareness” of the infringing activity, the court was not so sympathetic in A&M
Records v. Napster Inc. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1010 –
11 (9th Cir. 2001). In Napster, A&M Records sued Napster with a theory of
contributory copyright infringement, alleging that Napster facilitated copyright
infringement by knowingly allowing users to share copyrighted music and au dio
recordings. Id. at 1010–11, 1020. Napster argued that it should be protected
from liability through the DMCA’s safe harbor provision. Id. at 1025. The court
disagreed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Napster
was liable for contributory infringement. See id. The court opined that “Napste r
materially contribute[d] to the infringing activity” because it had “knowledge,
both actual and constructive, of direct infringement,” and failed to remove the
infringing material. Id. at 1022. Taken together, these two cases stand for the
proposition that an Internet service provider will not face liability if it takes
certain steps to remove infringing content once brought to light, but that the
Internet service provider could face liability if it induces or allows such
infringement to occur without any takedown procedures in place. Daniel S.
Schecter & Colin B. Vandell, Safe Harbor Protection for Online Service
Providers, LAW360 (Aug. 12, 2010), www.law360.com/articles/183778/saf e harbor-protection-for-online-service-providers (“Judge Stanton [in Viacom v.
YouTube] rejected Viacom’s arguments. After assessing the legislative history
and cases decided under the DMCA, the court concluded that generalized
knowledge was not enough to deprive a service provider of the safe harbor.
Instead, Judge Stanton concluded that the Section 512(c) safe harbor for a
service provider was available, unless the service provider had actual
knowledge of specific and identifiable infringement, and did not then
expeditiously act to remove or disable access to the infringing content. Such
knowledge would arise from a ‘red flag,’ which most commonly takes the form
of an explicit take-down notice sent by a copyright owner. If a service provider
was aware of specific, “obviously” infringing content that also would signal
actual knowledge and create the take-down obligation under Section 512(c).”).
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developed internal reporting systems designed to combat copyright
and trademark infringement. 126 This, in theory, shields them from
contributory infringement liability. 127 According to Twitter’s
Transparency Reports, it received over 53,000 DMCA copyright
notices in 2015 alone, including both takedown requests and
counter notices received. 128 This figure grew 89% from the previous
year. 129 In the latter half of 2015, Twitter removed 71% of the
allegedly infringing material. 130 Though it is clear that social media
websites have incentive to remove material after it receives a
takedown request, it is important that these websites not do so at
the expense of fairness to the alleged infringer. Moreover, as will be
seen later in this comment, sending a takedown request to the social
media site is just one of many possible options available for use
against an alleged infringer. 131

III. CURRENT OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR USE A GAINST AN
ALLEGED I NFRINGER ON SOCIAL MEDIA
This section will discuss the three courses of action available
to an owner whose intellectual property rights have been infringed
on a social media website. First it will explore a first option:
reporting the infringement directly to the social media website.
Next, it will examine a second option: sending a cease-and-des ist
letter to the infringing party. Finally, it will assess a third option:
commencing a lawsuit. Each subpart will delve into these alternate
courses of action, discussing the advantages and disadvantages of
each.

A. Reporting the Infringement Directly to the Social
Media Website
Three of the leading social media websites—Facebook, Twitter,
and YouTube—have implemented policies for the reporting and
takedown of intellectual property infringement. 132 Reporting
infringement directly to the social media website is inexpensive,
easy, and quick—all good things for the intellectual property

126. For a discussion on the various social media policies, see infra Part
II(A).
127. For a discussion on contributory infringement liability, see supra notes
110–125, and accompanying text.
128. Copyright Notices, TRANSPARENCY REPORT, https://transparency.
twitter.com/copyright-notices/2015/jul- dec (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. For a discussion on the various courses of action available for use
against an alleged infringer on social media, see infra Part II(A)–(C).
132. For a discussion on the various social media policies, see infra Part
II(A)(1)–(3).
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owner. 133 However, this option lacks transparency, which makes it
unclear whether this option promotes fairness, accuracy in
decisions, and consistency—all bad things for users and the general
public. 134 The various policies differ on substantive issues;
something might be considered a violation on Facebook, while being
considered licit on Twitter. 135 As one scholar noted:
[T]he largest social media sites have vastly different approaches to
username squatting and users’ rights. The differing approaches to
username disputes must logically lead to inconsistency of outcomes,
although there is little data on the subject. At the very least, the
inconsistency in approach to the subject renders planning and
prediction nearly impossible for users desiring to protect their names
or brands.136

Further, the policies are often vague and difficult to
understand. 137 For example, Facebook states that submitting an
infringement claim “may result in [the removal of] the reported
content from Facebook,” but does not delve into what their
seemingly voluntary decision making process entails. 138 Some have
described the decision making process as a black box, as “only a few
providers systematically release notices and none explicitly
describe their procedures.”139
133. Thomas J. Curtin, The Name Game: Cybersquatting And Trademark
Infringement On Social Media Websites, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 353, 393 (2010) (statin g
that the process of reporting a username squatter directly to the website is
“relatively inexpensive in comparison to litigating against the mark owner”).
134. This is because the law is undeveloped, and social media policies are
confusing and contradictory. See Steve Levy, Socially Unacceptable?,
FAIRWINDS
PARTNERS
BLOG
(Sept.
29,
2014),
http://
blog.fairwindspartners.com/brand-protection-social-media/socially-unacceptab
le-2 (mentioning that “[t]he patchwork of policies that arises from each site
establishing its own procedures can be frustrating to trademark owners tasked
with enforcing their marks”).
135. MCG RADY, supra note 1, § 12.03.
136. Id.
137. Reporting Trademark Infringements, FACEBOOK, www.facebook.com/
help/440684869305015/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
138. Id. This policy is ambiguous and vague. It is unclear whether or not
Facebook will remove the infringing content upon a determination of a valid
complaint, or whether such removal is purely optional.
139. Joséphine De Ruyck, Global Project Looks At Takedown Notices Across
The Internet, INTELL. PROP. WATCH
(July 23, 2014),
www.ipwatch.org/2014/07/23/global-project- looks-at-takedown-notices-across-theinternet/. Multiple websites have made efforts to make this information more
transparent. For example, Chilling Effects has created a database that collects
and analyzes legal complaints and takedown requests in the online arena.
CHILLING EFFECTS , www.chillingeffects.org/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
The Takedown Project is a global collaborative initiative that studies how
Internet websites handle notice-and-takedown procedures in instances of
alleged
online
copyright infringement.
THE TAKEDOWN
PROJECT ,
http://takedownproject.org/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). Legal Threats Database
provides a database for “lawsuits, cease [and] desist letters, subpoenas, and
other legal threats directed at those who engage in online speech.” Legal
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Facebook

Facebook is the world’s largest social media website, with over
1.5 billion monthly active users. 140 Facebook allows users—both
people and entities—to create a profile, add other users as friends,
post status updates, share videos and photos, send and receive
private messages, join groups, and “like” pages. 141 Facebook has
implemented certain policies to try to combat trademark and
copyright infringement. 142
Facebook does not allow users to “post content or take any
action on Facebook that infringes or violates someone else’s rights
or otherwise violates the law.”143 Facebook reserves the right to
remove any content posted on Facebook if it appears to violate any
of Facebook’s policies. 144 Although users are encouraged to resolve
any issues directly with those involved in the dispute, Facebook
allows users to report trademark and copyright infringement to
Facebook itself by submitting an infringement claim. 145 Facebook
reserves the right to remove any reported content from its website,
but will restore such content if the alleged infringing user contact s
Facebook (by filling out an online form) and Facebook determines
that the content should not have been removed. 146 Further,

Threats Database, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, www.dmlp.org/database (last
visited Jan. 7, 2016).
140. Social Media Comparison Inforgraphic, LEVERAGE (Sept. 1, 2015) ,
https://leveragenewagemedia.com/blog/social-media-infographic/.
141. See generally FACEBOOK, www.facebook.com/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) .
142. As previously discussed, intellectual property infringement is
abundant on Facebook. See supra Part I. For example, one article states that
“[c]opyright infringement on Facebook is quite simply ‘out of con trol,’” and
details what it describes as a “copyright infringement epidemic.” Rob Price,
Facebook's Copyright Infringement Epidemic, THE DAILY DOT (Oct. 29, 2014),
www.dailydot.com/entertainment/facebook-video-content-id-copyright-infring
ement/.
143. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBO O K ,
www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
144. See id. (stating “[w]e can remove any content or information you post
on Facebook if we believe that it violates this Statement or our policies.”).
145.
See
About
Copyright,
Facebook,
www.facebook.com/help
/249141925204375?helpref=page_content (last visited Sept. 4, 2016) (“If you
believe someone is using your copyrighted work without your permission, you
may wish to fill out this [infringement] form. You can also contact our
designated agent. In that case, please be sure to include a complete copyright
claim in your report. Keep in mind that you don’t need a Facebook account to
submit a report. Before you report a claim of copyright infringement, you may
want to send a message to the person who posted the content. You may be able
to resolve the issue without contacting Facebook.”). See also About Trademark ,
Facebook,
www.facebook.com/help/249141925204375?helpref=page_conte n t
(last visited Sept. 4, 2016).
146.
See
Reporting
Trademark
Infringements,
FACEBO O K ,
www.facebook.com/help/440684869305015/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) (“If the
content is removed based on United States trademark rights, they will also be
able to contact Facebook directly if they believe the content should not have
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Facebook has discretion to disable the accounts of recidivist
infringers on its website. 147
With regard to username squatters and impersonation
accounts, Facebook has a zero tolerance policy. 148 In its Statement
of Rights and Responsibilities, Facebook explains that its users
cannot falsify any personal information on their Facebook account
or create an account for anyone other than themselves without
permission. 149 Further, Facebook reserves the right to remove a
username that violates a trademark right and does not closely
relate to the user’s actual name. 150 A squatter can be reported by
either going to the imposter’s profile and clicking “report,” or by
filling out a complaint form on Facebook’s Help Center. 151
One example in particular gives a brief glimpse into Facebook’ s
removal system. In September of 2012, Facebook permanently
deleted “The Cool Hunters” Facebook page for copyright
infringement. 152 The Page’s 788,000 fans and 1,500–2,500 daily

been removed. Our team will review their submission, and if we determine that
the content should not have been removed, we will restore it and notify you that
we have restored that content.”). See also About Copyright, FACEBOOK, supra
note 145 (“If we remove your content because of a copyright claim, you’ll receive
a warning from Facebook that includes the contact information of the person or
company who made the report and/or the contents of the report. If you believe
the content should not have been removed, you can follow up with them directly
to try to resolve the issue. If the content was removed under the notice and
counter-notice procedures of the United States Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA), then you will be able to file a DMCA counter-notification. If that
is the case, you will also receive further instructions about this process in the
warning you receive from Facebook.”).
147. See FACEBOOK (Statement of Rights and Responsibilities), supra note
143 (stating that “[i]f you repeatedly infringe other people’s intellectu al
property rights, [Facebook] will disable your account when appropriate.”).
148. See FACEBOOK (Statement of Rights and Responsibilities), supra note
143 (mentioning that Facebook “reserve[s] the right to remove or reclaim” any
account if it deems appropriate).
149. Id. (stating“[y]ou will not provide any false personal information on
Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without
permission”).
150. See id. (mentioning that “[i]f you select a username or similar identifie r
for your account or Page, we reserve the right to remove or reclaim it if we
believe it is appropriate (such as when a trademark owner complains about a
username that does not closely relate to a user’s actual name)”).
151. How Do I Report A Fake Account That’s Pretendi ng to be me? ,
FACEBOOK, www.facebook.com/help/174210519303259 (last visited Jan. 7,
2016) (describing the different options a person can take to report a username
squatter).
152. Emil Protalinski, Facebook confirms it shut down The Cool Hunter’s
Facebook Page over copyright infringement, TNW NEWS (Oct. 5, 2012, 12:09
AM),
http://thenextweb.com/facebook/2012/10/05/facebook -confirms-it-sh u tdown-the-cool-hunters-facebook-page-over-copyright-infringement/.
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likes were lost in an instant. 153 The Page’s founder, Bill Tikos, took
to the Internet in frustration to explain what had happened:
No explanation, flimsy warnings, no instructions on what to do next.
None of our numerous attempts to rectify the situation and resurrect
the page have worked. And because we suspect there are other
businesses in the same bind, we are writing this to seek help and
encourage open conversation. This is not a minor problem. This is a
huge issue and potentially fatal to businesses. We feel that FB must
change its one-sided, secret policies and deal with us, and others like
us, openly and fairly.154

Although Tikos got his account restored briefly, it was quickly
terminated again—this time permanently. 155 Facebook stated that
“[t]his account has been disabled due to repeat copyright
infringement under our terms and the account has been removed
from the site accordingly. Additionally, we have thoroughly
reviewed all related reports and have determined that we took the
correct action in this case.”156 Tikos claims that he has no idea why
his page was deleted, although he thinks it might have to do with
the fact that his page “sometimes use[d] images even when [it did]
not know who ha[d] taken the picture.”157 Even if that was a valid
reason for Facebook’s removal of his page, it is troubling that
Facebook never once told Tikos why his Page was being removed
and never once gave him the opportunity to respond to any
accusations of infringement. This lack of transparency is
unacceptable. Though it might be more cost-effective, quick, and
easy for the social media site, it does so at the expense of
transparency and fairness to the alleged infringer and the public at
large.
2.

Twitter

Twitter is a social media website that allows users to publicly
blog by “Tweeting” pictures and messages in fewer than 140
characters. 158 To send a Tweet, a user must create a Twitter account
by selecting a unique Twitter handle. 159 Users can customize their
homepages by posting a profile picture and writing a blurb about
themselves. 160 Twitter has over 289 million active users, and 9,100
153. Michael Zhang, Facebook Shuttering Massive Pages for Violating Photo
Copyrights, PETAPIXEL (Oct. 8, 2012), http://petapixel.com/2012 /10/08/facebo o k shuttering-massive-pages-for-violating-photo-copyrights/; Protalinski, supra
note 152.
154. Protalinski, supra note 152.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See generally TWITTER, https://twitter.com/ (last visited Jan, 7, 2016).
159. Id.
160. Id. Many celebrities use Twitter. See Twitter Top 100 Most Followers,
TWITTER
COUNTER,
http://twittercounter.com/pages/100?utm_e xpi d
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Tweets a second. 161 Twitter has adopted a number of policies that
try to combat trademark and copyright infringement on its
website. 162
Under its Trademark Policy, Twitter states that “[u]sing a
company or business name, logo, or other trademark-protecte d
materials in a manner that may mislead or confuse others with
regard to its brand or business affiliation may be considered a
trademark policy violation.”163 Twitter reserves the right to reclaim
or suspend any account that uses the trademarked name or logo of
a business or individual in a manner that misleads others. 164
However, Twitter “may” give the account holder an opportunity to
clear up any confusion before doing so. 165 Interestingly, while
Facebook does not require a trademark to be registered to take
action against an infringer, such registration is a necessity on
Twitter. 166
Twitter reserves the right to remove any content that violates
a copyright “without prior notice, at [its] sole discretion, and
without liability.”167 Such copyright infringement can take the form
=102679131-65.MDYnsQdXQwO2AlKoJXVpSQ.0&utm_referrer=https%3A%2
F%2Fwww.google.com%2F (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). Katy Perry (@katyperry)
is the most followed Twitter user, with over 81 million followers. Id. Justin
Bieber (@justinbieber) is second with north of 73.5 million followers. Id.
Rounding out the top 10 is Taylor Swift (@taylorswift13), Barrack Obama
(@BarrackObama), YouTube (@YouTube), Rihanna (@rihanna), The Countess
(@ladygaga),
Ellen DeGeneres (@TheEllenShow), Justin Timberlake
(@jtimberlake), and Twitter (@twitter). Id.
161. See Leverage (Infographic), supra note 140.
162. For a further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 163–93, and
accompanying text.
163. Trademark
Policy, TWITTER
(updated
June 30,
2016) ,
https://support.twitter.com/articles/18367 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
164. The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/18 311
(last visited Jan. 7, 2016) (stating “[w]e reserve the right to reclaim usernames
on behalf of businesses or individuals that hold legal claim or trademark on
those usernames. Accounts using business names and/or logos to mislead others
may be permanently suspended”).
165. See id. (mentioning “[w]hen we determine that an account appears to
be confusing users, but is not purposefully passing itself off as the trademarked
good or service, we give the account holder an opportunity to clear up any
potential confusion”).
166. Id. Twitter states that it will review an account when it receives a
trademark violation report from a “trademark holder.” Id. When filling out a
Trademark Report Form on Facebook, the form allows you to continue even if
you do not have a registered trademark but instead have some “other basis for
trademark
rights.”
Trademark
Report
Form,
FACEBOO K ,
www.facebook.com/help/contact/284186058405647 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
167. Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos (last visite d
Jan. 7, 2016). To report a copyright violation, the claimant must provide Twitter
with the following information: “(i) a physical or electronic signature of the
copyright owner or a person authorized to act on their behalf; (ii) identificatio n
of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed; (iii) identification of the
material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity
and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information
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of “the unauthorized use of a copyrighted image as a profile photo,
header photo, or background . . . the unauthorized use of a
copyrighted video or image uploaded through [the] media hosting
services, or Tweets containing links to allegedly infringing
materials.”168
If Twitter decides to remove or restrict user content in response
to an infringement allegation, Twitter will “make a good faith effort”
to notify the account holder and provide him or her with a copy of
the takedown notice and information regarding how to file a
counter-notification. 169 Twitter will send a copy of any counter notification to the intellectual property owner who complained
about the infringement. 170 Afterward, unless Twitter receives notice
that the infringed owner is seeking a court order to prevent any
further infringement within 10 days, Twitter may restore the
blocked or restricted content. 171
Twitter does not allow users to engage in usernam e
squatting. 172 However, “[u]sers are allowed to create parody,
newsfeed, commentary, and fan accounts on Twitter.” 173 Twitter
will investigate any account that is reported to be an impersonation

reasonably sufficient to permit [Twitter] to locate the material; (iv) [the
claimant’s] contact information, including [his] address, telephone number, and
an email address; (v) a statement by [the claimant] that [he] ha[s] a good faith
belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by
the copyright owner, its agent, or the law; and (vi) a statement that the
information in the notification is accurate, and, under penalty of perjury, that
[the claimant is] authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner.” Id.
168. Copyright and DMCA Policy, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.co m
/articles/15795 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
169. See id. (stating “Twitter’s response to notices of alleged copyrigh t
infringement may include the removal or restriction of access to allegedly
infringing material. If we remove or restrict access to user content in response
to a notice of alleged infringement, Twitter will make a good faith effort to
contact the affected account holder with information concerning the removal or
restriction of access, including a copy of the takedown notice, along with
instructions for filing a counter-notification”).
170. Id.
171. Id. (noting “[u]pon receipt of a valid counter-notice, we will promptly
forward a copy to the person who filed the original notice. If we do not receive
notice within 10 business days that the original reporter is seeking a court order
to prevent further infringement of the material at issue, we may replace or cease
disabling access to the material that was removed”).
172. See TWITTER (The Twitter Rules), supra note 164. When determinin g
whether certain conduct constitutes username squatting, Twitter will take into
account factors such as: “the number of accounts created… creating accounts
for the purpose of preventing others from using those account names… creating
accounts for the purpose of selling those accounts . . . [and] using feeds of thirdparty content to update and maintain accounts under the names of those third
parties.” Id. Additionally, [a]ccounts that are inactive for more than six months
may also be removed without further notice.” Id.
173.
Parody,
Comedy,
and
Fan
Account
Policy,
TWITTER ,
https://support.twitter.com/articles/106373%20 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
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account to determine whether it violates Twitter’s rules. 174 To
comply with Twitter’s parody policy, “[t]he avatar should not be the
exact trademark or logo of the account subject . . . [and] the name
should not be the exact name of the account subject without some
other distinguishing word, such as ‘not,’ ‘fake,’ or ‘fan.’” 175 It should
be clear from the account’s profile information that the account is
not actually the company or business that the account is
commenting on or parodying. 176
If an account is determined to be in violation of Twitter’ s
impersonation policy, Twitter will either suspend the account or ask
the account holder to update the account so that it complies with
Twitter’s policies. 177 Twitter reserves the right to permanently
suspend the accounts of any recidivist infringers. 178 Selling
usernames is strictly prohibited. 179
Twitter’s policies can be extremely effective in resolving
trademark and copyright disputes. For example, StartupNation, an
online website that assists users in starting a business, wrote an
article in 2009 detailing Twitter’s response to a usernam e
squatter. 180 The article discussed how someone created a Twitter
174. See Reporting Impersonation Accounts, TWITTER, https://
support.twitter.com/groups/56-policies-violations/topics/238-report-aviolation/articles/20170142-reporting-impersonation-accounts (last visited Jan.
7, 2016) (stating “[u]pon receipt of an impersonation report, we will investigate
the reported accounts to determine if the accounts are in violation of the Twitter
Rules. Accounts determined to be in violation of our impersonation policy, or
those not in compliance with our parody, commentary, and fan account policy,
will either be suspended or asked to update the account(s) so they no longer
violate our policies”).
175. TWITTER, supra note 173. For example, the Twitter account “Not Mark
Zuckerberg” (@notzuckerberg) is not in violation of Twitter policies even though
it is accompanied by a picture of Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s founder. See Not
Mark
Zuckerberg
(@notzuckerberg),
TWITTER,
https://twitter.co m
/notzuckerberg.
176. TWITTER, supra note 163. For example, the fact that the Twitte r
account for “Bored Elon Musk” (@BoredElonMusk) states that “[t]his is a
futuristic hyper-parody account” in its account profile information probably
satisfies this requirement. See Bored Elon Musk (@BoredElonMusk), TWITTER ,
https://twitter.com/BoredElonMusk.
177. See TWITTER (Reporting Impersonation Accounts), supra note 174
(stating “[a]ccounts determined to be in violation of our impersonation policy,
or those not in compliance with our parody, commentary, and fan account policy,
will either be suspended or asked to update the account(s) so they no longer
violate our policies”).
178. See TWITTER, supra note 175 (“When we receive a valid impersonatio n
or trademark report about an account that violates our parody policy, we
temporarily suspend the account and may give the user the opportunity to come
into compliance. Accounts with a history of repeated violations may be
permanently suspended.”).
179. See TWITTER supra note 164 (mandating that “[y]ou may not buy or sell
Twitter usernames”).
180. Rich Sloan, How Someone Ripped off Our Twitter Name and We Fought
Back, STARTUP NATION (Aug. 2, 2009), www.startupnation.com/start-you r business/launch-your-invention/how-someone-ripped-off-our-twitter-name-
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account with the name “StartupNation” and was pretending to be
the actual StartupNation. 181 This imposter “built followers who
thought they were getting Tweets from StartupNation when it was
really a poser who had his own agenda to develop his own following
using [StartupNation’s] name, content, branding in the market,
etc.”182 StartupNation sent the imposter a direct message, to which
he responded that he would transfer the account for $15,000. 183
StartupNation then reported the imposter to Twitter. 184 Twitter
responded within 48 hours, asking for confirmation that
StartupNation owned the trademark for use of its name. 185 After
providing Twitter with proof, Twitter, within days, transferred the
account to StartupNation. 186
Twitter’s policies, when used correctly, can be very effective;
however, Twitter’s response to takedown requests has been
sporadic. In an example discussed earlier, we saw a photographer
sue Twitter after it failed to take action in response to her sending
Twitter 28 DMCA takedown requests. 187 In a similar lawsuit, artist
Christopher Boffoli sued Twitter for copyright infringement after it
failed to act on a DMCA takedown request he sent the site. 188 Yet
once the lawsuit was filed, Twitter removed the infringing
material. 189 Compare this to the instance in which Olga Lexell, a
freelance writer, filed a DMCA takedown request with Twitter,
reporting that multiple users had copied and reposted a joke that
she had originally tweeted in July of 2015. 190 Twitter promptly
and-we-fought-back/.
181. See id. (mentioning “not only was someone squatting on our name on
Twitter, but that person was periodically linking to content at our site and
acting as if he was us”).
182. Id.
183. Id. The imposter wrote: “I am asking for $15,000 to be transferred into
my PayPal account (r[xxxxxxxx]@gmail.com) at which point I will assign
‘startupnation’ twitter user name to an email account of your choice.” Id.
184. Id.
185. See id. (stating “Twitter responded within 48 hours asking for
confirmation that StartupNation owned the trademark for use of our name,
which I produced for them by visiting www.uspto.gov, searching for our
Trademark, and sending them the direct link confirming assignment to us”).
186. See id. (mentioning that “[w]ithin days, Twitter took action. The y
booted the poser and returned the rights to use ‘StartupNation’ on Twitter to
us”).
187. See supra notes 85–92, and accompanying text.
188. John Brodkin, Artist who sued Twitter over copyright declares victory —
via
settlement,
ARS
TECHNICA
(Nov.
2,
2012,
3:15
PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/11/artist-who-sued-twitter-over-copyri
ght-declares-victory-via-settlement/.
189. See id. (explaining that “suddenly, the pictures have been removed,
with messages stating ‘This image has been removed in response to a report
from the copyright holder.’ And Boffoli has withdrawn his lawsuit, saying the
case has been resolved to his satisfaction”).
190. Lorenzo Ligato, You Can’t Steal Jokes On Twitter Anymore,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2015, 05:15PM), www.huffingtonpost.com
/entry/dont-steal-jokes-on-twiter_us_55b67147e4b0224d88331c6d/.
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responded to Lexell’s takedown request by deleting the allegedly
infringing posts. 191 This non-uniform application of Twitter’s
policies is concerning. To be a viable dispute resolution mechanism,
Twitter must strive to be more uniform and transparent in its
decision making process.
3.

YouTube

YouTube is the world’s most popular online video platform ,
hosting both user-generated and professional content. 192 Videos on
the website cover a wide range of topics, such as music videos,
television clips, video blogs, and educational videos. 193 YouTube has
more than one billion users uploading over 400 hours of videos every
minute. 194 YouTube has implemented an array of policies that aim
to curtail trademark and copyright infringement. 195
YouTube reserves the right to remove content that violates a
trademark right. 196 Although using someone else’s trademark in a
username, tag, or title does not constitute infringement per se,
content that confuses viewers into “believing that the trademark
owner created or sponsors” the content may constitute trademark
infringement. 197 A trademark owner who believes that its
trademark is being infringed is “strongly encouraged” to resolve the
dispute directly with the user who posted the allegedly infringing
content. 198 YouTube states that it is “not in a position to mediate
191. Id. (explained in the video clip).
192. Statistics and Facts About YouTube, STATISTA (Jan. 2015) ,
www.statista.com/topics/2019/youtube/.
193. See generally YouTube, www.youtube.com/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) .
Google purchased YouTube for $1.65 billion in 2006. See Associated Press,
Google Buys YouTube for $1.65 Billion, NBC NEWS (Oct. 10, 2006),
www.nbcnews.com/id/15196982/ns/business-us_business/t/google-buys-youtub
e-billion/#.VpxIiJMrKCQ. At the time of the sale, it was “by far the most
expensive purchase made by Google during its eight-year history.” See id.
Google has since had larger acquisitions, such as its purchase of Motorola in
2011 for $12.5 billion. See Zach Epstein, Google Bought Motorola for $12.5B,
Sold it for $2.9B, and Called the Deal ‘A Success’, BGR (Feb. 14, 2014),
http://bgr.com/2014/02/13/google-motorola-sale-interview-lenovo/.
194. Statistics, YOUTUBE , www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.h tml (last
visited Jan. 7, 2016).
195. For a more detailed examination of YouTube’s various policies, see
infra notes 196–217, and accompanying text.
196. Legal
Policies, YOUTUBE ,
https://support.google.com/youtu be
/answer/2801979 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
197. See id. (“Using someone else’s trademark in a username, tags, or the
title of your video does not necessarily constitute infringement. However, if
there is content on your profile or video that would confuse viewers into
believing that the trademark owner created or sponsors your page or content,
then the trademark owner’s rights may be infringed. In these cases, we may
remove the content in question, so it’s important to be sensitive to other people’s
trademark rights when choosing a username or adding metadata to your
videos.”).
198. Id. (“If you are a trademark owner and you believe your trademark is
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trademark disputes between users and trademark owners.” 199 If
users are not able to resolve their dispute privately, a trademark
holder can fill out YouTube’s trademark claim form. 200 If the
complaint is reasonable, YouTube will conduct a limited
investigation and will remove content in cases of obvious
infringement. 201 However, YouTube fails to delve into what
“reasonable,” “limited investigation,” or “obvious infringement”
entail. 202
With regard to copyrights, a “copyright owner or an agent
authorized to act on the owner’s behalf” can submit a copyright
infringement notification if its copyrighted work is posted on
YouTube without its authorization. 203 A user affected by a copyright
claim can try to get the owner to retract its infringement claim by
messaging that owner directly. 204 However, it is unclear whether
YouTube allows users to file a formal counter-notification with the
website. 205
With regard to impersonation, YouTube states that
“[a]ctivities such as copying a user's channel layout, using a similar
username, or posing as another person in comments, emails, or
videos” may violate YouTube’s policies. 206 An account will be

being infringed, please note that YouTube is not in a position to mediate
trademark disputes between users and trademark owners. As a result, we
strongly encourage trademark owners to resolve their disputes directly with the
user who posted the content in question. Contacting the uploader may allow for
a quicker resolution to your claim in a way that is beneficial to you, the
uploader, and the YouTube community. Trademark owners can contact the user
through YouTube's private messaging feature or you can submit a complain t
directly to the uploader through our Trademark complaint form.”). Id.
199. Id.
200. See id. (directing users that “[i]f you are unable to reach a resolution
with the account holder in question, please submit a trademark claim through
our Trademark complaint form”).
201. See id. (stating “YouTube is willing to perform a limited investigatio n
of reasonable complaints and will remove content in cases of clear
infringement”).
202. Id. The terms are never defined on YouTube’s website.
203. See
Submit
a Copyright
Takedown Notice,
YOUTUBE ,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2807622?hl=en (last visited Jan. 7,
2016) (mentioning “[i]f you believe your copyright-protected work was posted on
YouTube without authorization, you may submit a copyright infringement
notification. These requests should only be submitted by the copyright owner or
an agent authorized to act on the owner’s behalf”).
204. See Retract a Claim of Copyright Infringement, YOUTUBE ,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2807691?hl=en (last visited Jan. 7,
2016) (stating “[i]f you’re a user affected by a copyright claim, you may reach
out to the copyright owner directly in search of a retraction. If the claimant has
a YouTube account, the easiest way to contact them is through YouTube’s
private messaging feature”).
205. Id.
206. Impersonation, YOUTUBE , https://support.google.com/youtube/answ e r/
2801947 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
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removed if YouTube determines that it was established to
impersonate another channel or individual. 207
YouTube sets itself apart from the other social media websites
by allowing copyright holders to proactively protect their
copyrighted work. 208 A copyright holder who meets certain criteria
can qualify for a Content ID.209 Through this Content ID system,
“[v]ideos uploaded to YouTube are scanned against a database of
files that have been submitted to [YouTube] by content owners.” 210
For example, if Universal Music Group owns the rights to Prince’s
song “Let’s go Crazy,” it can register that song so that it is flagged
whenever a video is uploaded to YouTube containing a portion of
the song. The copyright owner can choose which action to take if its
copyrighted audio or video clip is being used in an unauthorized
video. 211 Such “action varies from work to work and can include
blocking the uploaded video, tracking its use or monetizing the
content.”212
YouTube’s Content ID system has been controversial. For
example, in 2007, Stephanie Lenz uploaded a 29-second video to
YouTube of her young son dancing to the Prince song “Let’s go
Crazy.”213 Shortly thereafter, Prince’s YouTube management

207. Id. YouTube considers two types of impersonation. Id. First,
impersonation of a channel occurs when “[a] user copies a channel’s profile,
background, or text, and writes comments to make it look like somebody else’s
channel posted the comments. See id. Second, impersonation of an individu al
occurs is “[a] user creates a channel or video using another individual's real
name, image, or other personal information to deceive people into thinking they
are someone else on YouTube.” See id. Both of these types of impersonation can
be reported directly to YouTube. See id. Interestingly, YouTube does not allow
complaints for “channels or videos pretending to represent a business.” See id.
If a channel impersonates a business, YouTube states that the infringed “may
want to consider submitting a legal complaint via [YouTube’s] legal reporting
forms.” See id.
208. How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE , https://support.google.co m
/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
209. Id. Though YouTube’s website does not list the criteria, it states that
“[c]ontent ID acceptance is based on an evaluation of each applicant's actual
need for the tools,” and that “applicants may be rejected if other tools better suit
their
needs.”
Qualifying
for
Content
ID,
YOUTUBE ,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/1311402 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
210. YOUTUBE , supra note 208.
211. Id. YouTube’s Content ID system has many flaws. See Jonathan Bailey,
9 Questions and Answers Regarding YouTube and Content ID , PLAGIARI S M
TODAY (Dec. 23, 2013), www.plagiarismtoday.com/2013/12/23/9- questio n sanswers-regarding-youtube-content-id/. For example, one article states that
“Content ID is an automated process and isn’t able to make determinations of
fair use.” See id. “Even though many of the uses being trapped by Content ID
are almost certainly clear fair uses, Content ID, nor anyone else really [other
than a court of law], can make that determination definitively.” Id.
212. Id.
213. Sam Gutelle, “Dancing Baby” Woman Wins Fair Use Decision Against
Universal
Music
Group,
TUBE FILTER
(Sept.
14,
2015),
www.tubefilter.com/2015/09/14/stephan ie-lenz-lawsu it-universal-music-grou
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company, Universal Music Group, requested through the Content
ID system that Lenz remove the video. 214 Lenz responded by
initiating lawsuit against Universal, a decision that put in motion
seven years of appeals. 215 In affirming the District Court’s ruling in
favor of Lenz, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
“[c]opyright holders cannot shirk their duty to consider—in good
faith and prior to sending a takedown notification—wheth er
allegedly infringing material constitutes fair use.” 216 Although the
immediate impact of this case is still uncertain, it seems to question
the legal validity of a Content ID system that allows for the removal
of material without a proper fair use analysis.
YouTube’s internal policies, like those of Facebook and
Twitter, make removing content cheap and inexpensive for
trademark and copyright owners. 217 However, this comes at the
expense of transparency, uniformity, and fairness in decisions.
Though Universal may be in favor of such policies, surely Lenz and
her young son would oppose them.

B. Sending a Cease-and-Desist Letter
In addition to reporting the infringement to the social media
website, an intellectual property owner can also send a cease-anddesist letter directly to the infringing party. 218 A cease-and-desis t
letter, also called a demand letter, informs a recipient of its illegal
activity and demands that it stop using the intellectual property. 219
There may also be a demand for money to cover lost profits, unjust
enrichment, and/or attorneys’ fees. 220 Cease-and-desist letters are
frequently used in intellectual property disputes. 221 The letter
typically serves as the first form of contact between the parties. 222

p/.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2015).
217. For a discussion on the internal policies of Facebook, Twitter, and
Youtube, see infra Part II(A)(1)-(3).
218. Marketa Trimble, Setting Foot on Enemy Ground: Cease-and-Desist
Letters, DMCA NOTIFICATIONS AND PERS . JURISDICTION IN DECLARAT O R Y
JUDGMENT ACTIONS , 50 IDEA 777, 784 (2010).
219. Cease-and-Desist Letter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
220. Id.
221. See Trimble, supra note 218, at 784 (stating “[a]lthough not exclusive
to the area of intellectual property, cease-and-desist letters are frequently
utilized in disputes concerning intellectual property and represent an
important feature of the intellectual property law landscape”).
222. Michael J. McCue, The Letters of the Law: Sending Cease and Desist
Letters, 10 NEV . LAW. 23 (2002).
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A cease-and-desist letter has many beneficial functions. 223
First, it can operate as a coercive mechanism that causes the
infringing party to remove the infringing material for fear of
litigation. 224 Second, it can set in motion a licensing negotiation or
settlement agreement. 225 Finally, it puts the infringer on notice of
the allegation and can help a plaintiff prove willful infringement
(which can increase damages and attorneys’ fees) if the infringing
party continues to use the intellectual property. 226 For these
reasons, sending a cease-and-desist letter is often very effective and

223. See id. (stating that cease-and-desist letters “may have a number of
effects: they may be instrumental in commencing settlement negotiations or
serve as an impetus for licensing discussions; in patent cases they may trigger
the filing of reexamination requests or declaratory judgment actions and assist
in eliminating ‘bad’ patents from some of the overpatented fields of technology.
Letters may also mobilize their addressees to take steps in preparation for a
potential lawsuit and initiate development of alternative brands, products, and
design-around technologies”); see also McCue, supra note 222 (“[T]here are
several benefits to sending a pre-suit cease and desist letter: (1) the letter may
result in the recipient's compliance with the demand or a settlement without
incurring the expense or uncertainty of a lawsuit; (2) the letter may result in
the recipient's disclosure of its position and give the sender and its counsel the
opportunity to evaluate the merits of its case prior to deciding whether to file
suit; and (3) if the recipient does not cease its illegal conduct in response to the
letter, the sender may have a better chance of establishing that the recipient's
conduct is willful, which may affect the ability to obtain an award of punitive
damages. Moreover, courts have expressed disfavor towards plaintiffs who
commence litigation without first sending a cease and desist letter.”).
224. See Trimble, supra note 218, at 784. While most cease-and-desist
letters take a firm stance that can scare the recipient into removing the
infringing material, others can take a more lighthearted approach. Debra
Weiss, Jack Daniel’s Cease-and-Desist Letter Goes Viral for Being Exceedingly
Polite,
ABA
JOURNAL
(July
26,
2012),
www.abajournal.com
/news/article/jack_daniels_ceaseanddesist_letter_goes_viral_for_being_exceeed
ingly_poli/. For example, in 2012, Jack Daniels got positive publicity after
sending a cease-and-desist letter to a satirical author who used an edited
picture of the whisky label on her book cover. See id. The letter read: “We are
certainly flattered by your affection for the brand, but while we can appreciate
the pop culture appeal of Jack Daniel’s, we also have to be diligent to ensure
that the Jack Daniel’s trademarks are used correctly. Given the brand’s
popularity, it will probably come as no surprise that we come across designs like
this on a regular basis. What may not be so apparent, however, is that if we
allow uses like this one, we run the very real risk that our trademark w ill be
weakened. As a fan of the brand, I’m sure that is not something you intended
or would want to see happen. . . . In order to resolve this matter, because you
are both a Louisville ‘neighbor’ and a fan of the brand, we simply request that
you change the cover design when the book is re-printed. If you would be willing
to change the design sooner than that (including on the digital version), we
would be willing to contribute a reasonable amount towards the costs of doing
so.” See id.
225. Trimble, supra note 218, at 784.
226. See USPTO, supra note 9 (stating that if you do not respond to a cease and-desist letter and “are later found liable for infringement, the court may
determine that you acted recklessly and subject you to additional monetary
damages”).
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easy for intellectual property owners, who may willingly support a
system that has some frivolous and abusive claims, if that system
results in the speedy and inexpensive removal of the infringing
material. 227
However, sending a cease-and-desist letter is not always
effective for an intellectual property owner. 228 A cease-and-desis t
letter has no judicial backing; it is often the first step an intellectual
property owner takes, and merely threatens subsequent legal action
if the accused party does not refrain from continuing the allegedly
illegal behavior. 229 Though it may help a plaintiff prove willful
infringement, there are often no repercussions—other than the
threat of further legal action—for a party that refuses to respond or
take action after receiving a cease-and-desist letter. 230 Because of
this, reporting the infringement directly to the social media website
might be more effective than sending a cease-and-desist letter. 231
Additionally, it may be difficult to determine to whom the
cease-and-desist letter should be sent. 232 An infringed party has to
try to ascertain the infringer’s home or business address and send
the cease-and-desist letter there. 233 Although this might not be a
problem if the infringing party provides accurate contact

227. See Trimble, supra note 218, at 784.
228. Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Fear And Loathing: Shame, Shaming, And
Intellectual Property, 63 DE PAUL L. REV . 1, 26 (2013) (discussing some of the
negative aspects to sending a cease-and-desist letter, such as the negative
attention the sending party receives); see also McCue, supra note 225
(“Although there are several benefits to sending a cease and desist letter, there
are also several risks: (1) the cease and desist letter may trigger a declaratory
judgment action in an unfavorable forum; (2) the cease and desist letter may
form the basis for liability; or (3) the cease and desist letter may contain
inadvertent omissions. This article explores the pitfalls of sending cease and
desist letters in the context of intellectual property disputes in federal practice ,
but the principles are generally applicable to all areas of practice.”).
229. See Trimble, supra note 220, at 784.
230. See USPTO, supra note 9 (stating that you do not need to respond to a
cease-and-desist letter; however, if you do not respond and “are later found
liable for infringement, the court may determine that you acted recklessly and
subject you to additional monetary damages”). Further, “courts have repeatedly
confirmed that a cease-and-desist letter by itself, absent other acts in the forum,
will not present a sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident rights holder in a declaratory judgment action.” See Trimble ,
supra note 220, at 784.
231. See Whitney C.Gibson & Jordan S. Cohen, How to Report Trademark,
Other IP Infringement on Facebook, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 3, 2015),
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=cabfaac7-e3ff-484d-a785-ab1d5670d4
68 (mentioning that “[s]ubmitting a report about the alleged infringement to
Facebook might be more effective than contacting the alleged infringer
[directly]”). However, as noted before, these courses of action are not mutually
exclusive; an infringed party might report the infringement to the website while
simultaneously sending a cease-and-desist letter to the infringing party and
subsequently filing a lawsuit. See Thomas & Newman, supra note 5.
232. See Gibson & Cohen, supra note 231.
233. Id.
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information on their social media profile, it can be difficult if there
is no contact information listed or if the information provided is
false or inaccurate. 234 Social media infringers can hide behind their
IP address, making it difficult for an owner to ascertain their
private contact information. 235 Alternatively, infringed parties have
started sending cease-and-desist letters through a private or public
message on the social media website itself. 236 In 2008, for example,
Burger King served a cease-and-desist letter through Twitter to the
owner of the account “@whoppervirgins.” 237 “Whopper Virgins” was
the slogan for Burger King’s multi-million dollar ad campaign that
depicted Hmong, Inuit, and Romanian villagers eating the
restaurant’s burgers for the first time. 238 On December 17, 2008,
Burger King’s official Twitter page “@theBKlounge” sent a public
message to “@whoppervirgins” via a Tweet that read in all caps:
“CEASE
AND
DESIST.
UNAUTHORIZED
USE
OF
TRADEMARK.”239 Although the result of the publicly sent ceaseand-desist letter is unknown, this serves as a good example of how
companies are more amenable to sending cease-and-desist letters
over social media websites. 240
234. See id. (stating that reporting infringement directly to the social media
website directly might be more effective than sending a cease -and-desist letter).
235. Many users use proxy networks and virtual private networks (VPN)
that mask their IP address and assigns them a new one so it appears as if they
are accessing the social media website from a different location. See Natash a
Stokes, How to Browse the Web Anonymously, TECHLICIOUS (Dec. 8, 2015),
www.techlicious.com/tip/how-to-browse-the-web-anonymously/.
One study
showed that as many as 410 million people worldwide use technologies such as
private browsers, VPNs, and proxy servers to mask their true location. See
Chris Smith, Seriously Dark Traffic: 500 Mil. People Globally Hide Their IP
Addresses, DIGIDAY (Nov. 18 2014), http://digiday.com/publishers/vpn-hide - ipaddress-distort-analytics/. This allows users to appear as if they are surfing the
Internet from an entirely different country. See id. This would make it nearly
impossible for a trademark or copyright owner to ascertain an infringing user’s
location in order to send him or her a cease-and-desist letter.
236. Gibson & Cohen, supra note 231.
237. Dennis Yang, Did Burger King Really Just Issue A C&D Through
Twitter?, TECHDIRT (Dec. 18, 2008), www.techdirt.com/articles/200812 18/
1926583171.shtml. The “@whoppervirgin” bio was left blank. Whoppervirgin s
(@whoppervirgins), TWITTER, http://twitter.com/whoppervirgins (last visite d
Jan. 7, 2015)).
238. Yang, supra note 237.
239. Burger King (@theBKlounge), TWITTER (Dec. 17, 2008, 2:09 PM) ,
https://twitter.com/theBKlounge/status/1063696337.
However,
“@theBK
lounge” “may not really be Burger King.” Yang, supra note 237.
240. Some people believe that “@whoppervirgins” was set up by Burger King
and that the publicly sent cease-and-desist letter was a publicity stunt. Sachin
Balagopalan, @whoppervirgins - Cease and Desist, REPUBLIC O F INTERNET S
(Dec. 19, 2008), www.republicofinternets.com/?p=1321. The “@whoppervirgin s”
Twitter handle is still active, with 64 Tweets and 351 followers. Whoppervirgin s
(@whoppervirgins), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/whoppervirgin s (last visite d
Jan. 7, 2015). However, the last post was on January 30th, 2009, and read:
“Whopper Virgin, died Tuesday choking on a whopper at age unknown, leaving
behind an expansive collection whopper wrappers and excrement.”
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Sending a cease-and-desist letter can also open a person or
entity up to a flood of negative publicity. 241 Taco John’s, a Wyomingbased Mexican restaurant chain, learned this the hard way when it
asserted its trademark rights to the phrase “Taco Tuesday.” 242 Since
1989, Taco John’s has owned U.S. Trademark Registration No.
1,572,589 for the use of “Taco Tuesday” in the restaurant services
industry. 243 In 2010, Taco John’s sent a cease-and-desist letter to
Iguana Grill, an Oklahoma based Mexican restaurant that was
using the phrase “Taco Tuesday” along with the hashtag
“#tacotuesday” on Twitter to promote its specials. 244 Taco John’s,
using its twitter handle “@TacoJohn’s” even Tweeted: “Taco John’s
holds the copyright [sic] to Taco Tuesday giving us the exclusive
right to use and protect it.”245 This turned into a public relations
disaster for Taco John’s, as the online community rallied around
Iguana Grill. 246 Iguana Grill sold a record number of tacos the
following Tuesday. 247 However, one could argue that the public
Tweet ultimately worked for Taco John’s. Iguana Grill eventually
agreed to stop using “Taco Tuesday” in its advertising efforts,

Whoppervirgins (@whoppervirgins), TWITTER (Jan. 30, 2009, 7:26 AM),
https://twitter.com/whoppervirgins/status/1161879250. It is unknown whether
the account is currently run by its original owner, whether it is now run by
Burger King, or whether it has since been abandoned.
241. This is because the law is undeveloped, and social media policies are
confusing and contradictory. Levy, supra note 134 (stating “[t]he patchwork of
policies that arises from each site establishing its own procedures can be
frustrating to trademark owners tasked with enforcing their marks”); Gregory
S. Bernabeo, Defending Your Trademarks in the Social Media World ,
BLOOMBERG
LAW
REPORTS ,
www.saul.com/sites/default/file s/
1047_PDF_2734.pdf (noting that “unlike domain name cybersquatting and
trademark abuses for which specific legal remedies are well-established, law
and procedures for resolving social media trademark issues are in their
infancy”).
242. See Dina Roumiantseva & Aaron Rubin, #Trademarks?: Hashtags as
Trademarks, SOCIALLY AWARE (May 13, 2015), www.sociallyawareblog.
com/2015/05/13/trademarks-hashtags-as-trademarks/.
243. USPTO, http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4809:
677dx2.3.13 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
244. Roumiantseva & Rubin, supra note 242.
245. Emily E. Campbell, Taco John’s Claims Rights in Taco Tuesday ,
DUNLAP CODDING (Aug. 4, 2010), http://dunlapcodding.com/phosita/2010/ 08
/taco-johns-claims-rights-taco-tuesday.
246. Id. Angry Twitter users Tweeted things like: “petition @tacojohns to
stop copyright enforcement of #tacotuesday hashtag,” “#tacotuesday is used all
over CA! But qdoba uses #tacomonday. Who want #tacowednesday...Pate n t
pending,” “Potential new @iguanaokc promotion: @TacoJohns Sucks Tuesday
#tacotuesday (They don't have a patent on that one.),” “So does anyone know if
ThirstyThursday has a copyright? If so, Who will hold a big party to celebrate
the end? #tacotuesday,” and “Their trademark can't keep the customers from
calling it #TacoTuesday.” Id.
247. Id.
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instead telling customers to “[k]eep a look out for our taco specials .
. . for Iguana Tuesday!”248
In addition to sometimes being ineffective for intellectual
property owners, cease-and-desist letters also have many
disadvantages from the perspective of the public in general. 249
Cease-and-desist letters can be frivolous and abusive, and no third
party evaluates a claim of infringement. 250 A party could always
contact an attorney and file an action for declaratory judgment of
noninfringement, but that is expensive. 251 Though intellectual
property owners might like the fact that this option gives them a
quick and inexpensive solution, the general public should be
concerned that this option might lack fairness and accuracy in its
results. 252 We do not know the content of these cease-and-desis t
letters, or even how many letters are sent. 253 Moreover, the public
sometimes views sending a cease-and-desist letter as a bullying
tactic, in which corporations use the threat of litigation to scare
users into removing content that a court of law may or may not find
to be infringing. 254
248. Roumiantseva & Rubin, supra note 242.
249. Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform 2013: Demand Letter Transparency Act
of 2013, PATENTLYO (Nov. 20, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/20 13
/11/patent-reform-2013-demand-letter-transparency-act-of-2013.htm l
(discussing a proposed Demand Letter Transparency Act that would combat the
lack of transparency in patent cease-and-desist letters), see also Notes of
Advisory Committee, FED. R. CIV . P. 57.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L.
REV . 625, 648–49 (2011) (“The majority of cease-and-desist letters include a
variety of aspects that unfairly take advantage of small businesses’ or
individuals’ lack of legal knowledge. The cease-and-desist letter is typically
written by a lawyer (either the corporation’s in-house lawyer or an outside law
firm) and written in legalese. The letter will sometimes cite to court cases, which
may or may not be relevant to the small business or individual (not that the
victim would have reason to know that). Not only do these letters take unfair
advantage of the recipients’ lack of legal knowledge, there is also an element of
emotional coercion. This type of letter from a lawyer, received by a non-lawyer,
often brings emotional distress, which many recipients of cease-and-desist
letters cite upon receipt. In addition, many large corporations demand an
extremely short time-frame for a response by the small business. This takes
further advantage of the recipients’ lack of legal knowledge, as the short time
frame does not provide enough time for the small business to properly consult
an attorney.”).
253. Id.
254. For example, Chick Fil-A sent Bo Muller-Moore a cease-and-desist
letter in 2011 after he filed a trademark claim for the phrase “Eat More Kale,”
a phrase which he would print on t-shirts. Abby Ohlheiser, ‘Eat More Kale’ Guy
Wins Trademark Battle With Chick fil-A. Vermont Rejoices, Naturally., THE
WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-natio n /
wp/2014/12/12/eat-more-kale-guy-wins-trademark-battle-with-chick-fil-a-verm
ont-rejoices-naturally/. Chick Fil-A claimed that the phrase infringed on their
“Eat Mor Chickin” slogan. Id. Muller-Moore, with the help of bro bono legal aid,
ignored the cease-and-desist letter, and proceeded with his trademark claim .
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In sum, while sending a cease-and-desist letter has many
benefits, it also has many drawbacks. When weighing the merits of
a dispute resolution mechanism, it is imperative not to sacrifice fair
and accurate results for speed and cost considerations. Some of
these drawbacks can be solved with litigation. Litigation not only
allows a plaintiff to identify a user by getting a subpoena, but it also
strives to reduce frivolous and abusive tactics, and to create a
mechanism that allows for fairness and accuracy in results. 255

C. Initiating a Lawsuit
As an alternative or additional step to reporting the
infringement to the social media website or sending a cease-anddesist letter, an infringed party can initiate a lawsuit against an
infringing party. 256 Like the other options, this course of action
comes with many advantages and disadvantages. 257 Unlike
reporting infringement to the social media website or sending a
cease-and-desist letter, a lawsuit allows an intellectual property
owner to recover damages in some instances. 258 Additionally, filing
a lawsuit and getting a court order may be a necessary step if an
intellectual property owner is trying to determine the identity of an
infringer. 259 Moreover, courts often publish opinions and abide by
precedent. 260 This means that the system as a whole promotes more

Id. He prevailed in that claim. Id. Vermont Governor Peter Shumlin (D) calle d
Chick Fil-A a corporate bully, stating that “[t]his isn’t just a win for the little
guy who stands up to a corporate bully; it’s a win for our state. In Vermont, we
care about what’s in our food, who grows it, and where it comes from.” Id.
Senator Patrick Leahy (D) also commented on the dispute, stating that “[l]aws
that protect the intellectual property rights are crucial to U.S. creativity and
our economy. But we’ve also seen in the past how trademark laws can be
misused by deep-pocketed corporations to bully small businesses. This is a
happy ending to a long struggle for a Vermont entrepreneur.” Id.
255. See supra Part II(C).
256. Thomas & Newman, supra note 5.
257. See id. (stating that although traditional enforcement techniques such
as initiating a lawsuit can be an effective mechanism for protecting intellectu al
property rights on social media websites, it can also alienate an IP owner’s
customers and create negative publicity).
258. Terrance P. Ross, Intellectual Property Law: Damages and Remedies ,
L. J. PRESS § 1.03 (2015).
259. Marisa A. Trasatti & Anna C. Horevay, Litigation and Social Media:
Using Social Media to Your Advantage at Every Step of the Trial , 63 FDCC
Q UARTERLY
4,
265
(2013),
www.semmes.com/publications_archive
/litigation/pdf/litigation-and-social-media.pdf (stating that “plaintiffs may file
suit and then serve a subpoena upon an Internet service provider to obtain the
identity of the person using a particular IP address”).
260. The legal principle of stare decisis ensures that judges respect the
precedent set by previous courts. Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th
ed. 2009).
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transparency, consistency, and fairness in decisions—important
qualities that are lacking from the other two courses of action. 261
However, there are some disadvantages to this approach.
Initiating a lawsuit is often expensive, time consuming, and the law
surrounding trademarks and copyrights on social media may be
unclear. 262 First, lawsuits are costly. Aside from large corporations,
many people lack the resources to pay for such litigation. 263
According to a 2015 economic report published by the American
Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), the median cost of
trademark litigation, not including appeal, is between $325,000 and
$1.6 million depending on the amount in controversy. 264 The median
cost of copyright litigation, not including appeal, is between
$250,000 and $1.2 million depending on the amount in
controversy. 265 One famous illustration of litigation costs involved a
261. For a discussion on the other two courses of action, see supra Part II(A) –
(B).
262. See Klemchuk & Sullivan, supra note 10 (stating that “case law
pertaining to trademark infringement on social networking sites is sparse. Most
cases settle early or are resolved through dispute resolution mechanisms within
the social networking website”); see also Bernabeo, supra note 243 (stating that
“unlike domain name cybersquatting and trademark abuses for which specific
legal remedies are well-established, law and procedures for resolving social
media trademark issues are in their infancy”).
263. See Curtin, supra note 133, at 387. (stating that “litigation is costly and
burdensome for defendants” and that “the high cost of litigation will discourage
users from expressing themselves in a social setting”). American adults have a
median net worth of only $44,900. See Tami Luhby, America's Middle Class:
Poorer
Than
You
Think,
CNN
MONEY
(Aug.
5,
2014),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/11/news/economy/middle -class-wealth/.
This
means that more than half of American adults have less than $45,000 to their
name. See id.
264.
AM .
INTELLECTUAL
PROP.
LAW
ASS ’N,
REPORT
OF
THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2015, at 38–39 (2015) (stating that in 2015 the median
cost of a trademark infringement lawsuit was $325,000 for a dispute with less
than $1 million in controversy, $500,000 for a dispute with between $1 millio n
and $10 million in controversy, $720,000 for a dispute with between $10 millio n
and $25 million in controversy, and $1.6 million for a dispute with over $25
million in controversy). Mediating these disputes is much cheaper. Id. (statin g
that in 2015 the median cost of mediating a trademark infringement lawsuit
was $50,000 for a dispute with less than $1 million in controversy, $75,000 for
a dispute with between $1 million and $10 million in controversy, $100,000 for
a dispute with between $10 million and $25 million in controversy, and
$100,000 for a dispute with over $25 million in controversy).
265. Id. at 39 (stating that in 2015 the median cost of a copyrigh t
infringement lawsuit was $250,000 for a dispute with less than $1 million in
controversy, $500,000 for a dispute with between $1 million and $10 million in
controversy, $750,000 for a dispute with between $10 million and $25 millio n
in controversy and $1.2 million for a dispute with over $25 million in
controversy). Mediating these disputes is much cheaper. Id. (stating that in
2015 the median cost of mediating a copyright infringement lawsuit was
$40,000 for a dispute with less than $1 million in controversy, $63,000 for a
dispute with between $1 million and $10 million in controversy, $100,000 for a
dispute with between $10 million and $25 million in controversy, and $100,000
for a dispute with over $25 million in controversy); See also Mprose, UPDATE:
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2007 lawsuit between Luis Vuitton and Haute Diggity Dog, a small
company that sold “Chewy Vuitton” dog products. 266 Luis Vuitton
sued Haute Diggity Dog for trademark, trade dress, and copyright
infringement. 267 Haute Diggity Dog won on appeal after asserting a
parody defense. 268 The win, however, did not come cheap. 269 Haute
Diggity Dog “incurred approximately $300,000.00 in legal fees and
spent years in court” defending itself against Louis Vuitton. 270
Haute Diggity Dog also “lost distributors and had merchandise sent
back as a result of the lawsuit.”271
Second, lawsuits are time consuming. The average time for
trademark and copyright litigation is three years, not including
appeals. 272 As was seen earlier in this paper, Stephanie Lenz was in
court for over 7 years in order to defend a YouTube video of her son
dancing to Prince’s “Let’s go Crazy” from removal by Universal
Music Group. 273 Further, social media is a transitory forum. 274

Explaining the Continuing Surge in the U.S. of Non -English Language
Document
Review
Projects,
POSSE
LIST
(Apr.
27,
2011),
www.theposselist.com/2011/04/27/the-surge-in-foreign-language-document-rev
iew-projects/ (stating that in 2011, The average cost of trademark litigation was
$600,000, while the average cost of copyright litigation was between $500,000
and $800,000, barring appeal).
266. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d
252, 256 (4th Cir. 2007). For another example of the exorbitant costs of
trademark litigation, see E. Iowa Plastics, Inc. v. PI, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
86889, *3–5 (N.D. Iowa July 2, 2015). In that 2015 case, plaintiff alleged
trademark infringement for defendant’s use of trademarked egg flats. Id. The
case went to jury. See id. The court ultimately ruled “[a]fter a thorough review
of the record and the billing data, including hours and rates, under all the
circumstances, plaintiff is awarded a reasonable attorneys' fee of Five Hundred
Eight-Five Thousand Dollars ($585,000.00).” Another example involves a 2001
case in which a jury found defendant wholesaler liable for trade dress
infringement, contributory trade dress infringement, and dilution of
plaintiff manufacturer's registered trademarks. See Coach, Inc. v. We Care
Trading Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9879, *14–16, 48 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2001).
There, the court noted “Coach seeks an award of $ 405,578.94 in total fees and
costs. We Care does not object to Coach's request for attorneys' fees on the
more traditional grounds that they are duplicative or unreasonable, except to
the extent that it argues fees should be awarded only for those claims on which
Coach won at trial.” Id. at 48.
267. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 507 F.3d at 256.
268. Id. at 254, 257.
269. See Milord A. Keshishian, Trademark, Trade Dress & Copyright
Litigation - Appellate Court Rules Against Louis Vuitton, L.A. INTELL. PROP .
TRADEMARK
ATTORNEY
BLOG
(Jan.
30,
2008),
www.iptrademarkattorney.com/2008/01/appellate_court_rules_against_1.htm l.
270. Id.
271. Peter Lattman, “Chewy Vuiton” Beats Louis Vuitton, But Feels a Bite,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2006), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/11/28/chewy-vuito n beats-louis-vuitton-but-feels-a-bite/.
272. Mprose, supra note 265.
273. See supra note 215, and accompanying text.
274. See Roberto A. Ferdman, When to Post Things to Facebook if you Wan t
the Most Likes, WASH. POST (Jul. 2, 2015), www.washingtonpost.com

2016]

The Wild West Of IP Enforcement On Social Media

1001

Someone’s Facebook post will often become irrelevant hours after
the initial posting, let alone three years later. 275 Unless the plaintiff
is seeking damages, most litigation over social media intellectual
property disputes is pointless if it is not against a recidivist
infringer or a username squatter. 276 Granting an injunction to
remove a three-year old infringing post will only burden the courts,
and may not be worth the time and expense to trademark and
copyright owners. 277
Finally, the law surrounding trademark and copyright
infringement on social media websites is still undeveloped. 278 It is
unknown whether this lack of case law is due to the fact that
intellectual property owners prefer resolving their disputes by
reporting the infringement directly to the website and/or sending a
cease-and-desist letter, or because litigation is so time consuming
and expensive. 279 Though courts certainly rely on traditional
trademark and copyright precedent, social media disputes are
unique, application of established law is difficult, and outcomes are
hard to predict. 280 As one legal scholar noted: “cases tend to end up
settling out of court once the process has begun due to the
unpredictability of their results at trial.”281 For example, in the
North Jersey Media Group case, discussed earlier, North Jersey
Media Group sued Fox News for copyright infringement after Fox
News posted on its Facebook account an image of three firefighters
hoisting an American flag at the ruins of the World Trade Center

/news/wonk/wp/2015/07/02/when-to-post-things-to-facebook-if-you-want-themost-likes/ (citing research that indicates that most likes, shares, and
comments occur “occur within the first 2 hours of posting times,” and that that
number is even shorter for Twitter).
275. Id.
276. MCG RADY, supra note 1, at § 12.03. For example, an order to terminate
a parody account will prevent continued and future damage to the plaintif f .
Further, an order to delete a recidivist user’s account will prevent future
damage to the plaintiff. However, an order to delete a o ne-time user’s account
or infringing post will likely not prevent any damage. This is because a one -time
infringer’s post will not damage the plaintiff in the future; all the damage will
have already occurred by the time litigation is commenced.
277. See id. (stating that the burden on the courts in the current system is
undeniable).
278. See id. (stating that “there is little to no legal precedent regarding many
of the issues that arise in username disputes”).
279. See id. McGrady states that the lack of case law is due to “the
unpredictability of their results at trial.” See id. (stating that username
squatting “cases tend to end up settling out of court once the process has begun
due to the unpredictability of their results at trial”). It could be that IP owners
are persuaded to forgo litigation due to its high time and costs, but it could also
be that IP owner chose not to pursue litigation because the other two courses of
action are so effective.
280. For a discussion on traditional trademark and copyright infringement
on social media websites, see supra Part I.
281. MCG RADY, supra note 1, at § 12.03.
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site on the day of the attacks. 282 Fox claimed that its posting of the
picture was protected under the fair use doctrine, and the Court
used traditional fair use law to deny Fox News’ motion for summary
judgment. 283 However, on appeal, Fox News argued that the Court
erred in not taking into account the “unique, transformative
qualities of social media” when weighing fair use. 284 Fox argued that
because of the nature of social media, the post was part of a global
conversation, and not a promotion. 285 Additionally, Fox argued that
allowing the ruling to stand would have “massive implications for
the millions of Americans who use social media on a regular
basis.”286 Although the appeal was only pending when Fox News
reached a settlement agreement with North Jersey Media Group, it
raised a question about whether future courts might apply existing
law to social media disputes in new and unique ways. 287
Overall, litigation promotes transparency, consistency, and
fairness in decisions. 288 However, it is not a perfect solution.
Litigation can often be time consuming, expensive, and
unpredictable. 289 None of the current courses of action—reporting
the infringement directly to the social media website, sending a
cease-and-desist letter, and initiating litigation—provides a
complete solution that balances cost, time, transparency, and
uniformity. 290 Maybe it is time to look elsewhere for such a solution.

IV. HOW THE UDRP TARGETS CYBERSQUATTING
As the preceding section discussed, the three current options
to remedy infringement on social media, while at times effective,
are not perfect. 291 A possible fourth option is to adopt a mechanism
for resolving trademark and copyright disputes on social media
similar to the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP). The UDRP is a uniform dispute resolution mechanism that
is effective in providing a timely and inexpensive solution to
trademark owners who want to stop domain name squatters. 292 The
282. Gardner, supra note 99.
283. N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Jeanine Pirro & Fox News Network, LLC,
74 F. Supp. 3d 605, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
284. See Donahue, supra note 106. As discussed earlier, fair use of a
copyrighted work “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching . . ., scholarship, or research,” is not copyright infringement.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 107. For a discussion on the fair use doctrine, see supra notes 95–109, and
accompanying text.
285. Donahue, supra note 106.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See supra notes 257–61, and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 262–87, and accompanying text.
290. See supra Part II.
291. See supra Part II.
292. ICANN, supra note 16; see also Bluestone, supra note 45, at 587 (statin g
that “[t]he Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), adopte d
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UDRP’s scope is limited to trademark infringement in domain
names themselves; it does not apply to trademarks in the content of
a website and does not apply to copyrights. 293 UDRP proceedings
are private, and users agree to the arbitration by contract. 294
The UDRP was established by the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a non-profit corporation
formed to manage the Internet domain name system. 295 The UDRP
applies to top-level domains (.com, .net, .org, etc.). 296 It does not
apply to usernames registered on social media sites, because they
are lower level subpages that appear after the top-level domain (for
example, twitter.com/oneok would not be covered, while both
twitter.com and oneok.com would be covered). 297 All top-level
domain name registrars must agree to follow the UDRP, and all
domain name registrants and users must submit to the UDRP
proceedings if a formal complaint is filed against them. 298
There are currently five authorized service providers that
receive complaints and provide an administrative panel to hear the

by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), is an
instrument that provides remedy to cybersquatting victims. The UDRP is
composed of arbitrators who have the power to provide limited relief by either
transferring the domain name to the complainant, or cancelling the domain
name”).
293. See ICANN, supra note 16.
294. See id. (mentioning “[t]he UDRP is a policy between a registrar and its
customer and is included in registration agreements for all ICANN-accredite d
registrars”).
295. ICANN, supra note 16.
296. See id. (stating “[t]he Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP) has been adopted by ICANN-accredited registrars in all gTLDs (.aero,
.asia, .biz, .cat, .com, .coop, .info, .jobs, .mobi, .museum, .name, .net, .org, .pro,
.tel and .travel)”); see also G ILSON ET AL., supra note 19, at § 7A.02 (“A domain
name may be up to sixty-seven characters long, including the characters of the
“dot” and the top level domain name (e.g., “com”). A typical domain name
consists of letters, numbers and hyphens, though hyphens may not be used at
the beginning or the end of a domain name . . . The characters to the left of .com,
.org, .net and other gTLDs are called second-level domain names. For example,
in www.uspto.gov, “uspto” is the second-level domain name. The characters to
the right of the period in a domain name are called top-level domain names. In
www.uspto.gov, “gov” is the top-level domain name.”).
297. Id.; G ILSON ET AL., supra note 19, at § 7A.04.
298. See G ILSON ET AL., supra note 19, at § 7A.06. Domain name registran ts
are bound to the UDRP by the contractual terms of their registratio n
agreements with the registrar.
See Consensus Policies, ICANN,
www.icann.org/resources/pages/registrars/consensus-policies-en (last visite d
Jan. 7, 2016). The Registrar Accreditation Agreement states that: “[d]uring the
Term of this Agreement, Registrar shall have in place a policy and procedures
for resolution of disputes concerning Registered Names. Until ICANN adopts
an alternative Consensus Policy or other Specification or Policy with respect to
the resolution of disputes concerning Registered Names, Registrar shall comply
with the Uniform Domain NameDispute Resolution Policy.” 2013 Registrar
Accreditation Agreement, ICANN, at § 3.8, www.icann.org/resources/
pages/approved-with-specs-2013-09-17-en#raa.
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expedited dispute. 299 The largest of the service providers, the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), has handled in excess
of 31,750 UDRP cases. 300 The UDRP strives for transparency; all
decisions are posted to the ICANN website and the service
provider’s website. 301
A complainant under the UDRP has the initial burden of
proving that: “(i) [the] domain name is identical or confusingly
similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant
has rights; and (ii) [the respondent has] no rights or legitimate
interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) [the] domain name
has been registered and is being used in bad faith.” 302 The claimant
usually pays all fees; however, fees will be split evenly amongst the
parties in cases where the respondent elects to expand the
Administrative Panel from one to three panelists. 303
The UDRP has many advantages. 304 The UDRP provides for
expedited proceedings, and costs are typically lower than those in
traditional
litigation. 305
Further, the UDRP allows
for
transparency, fairness in decisions, and consistency, as the
elements of the prima facie case and burden of proof are uniform
across all “jurisdictions,” and all decisions are published. 306 Finally,

299. G ILSON ET AL., supra note 19, at § 7A.06.
300. As of July 2015. Id. Of the 31,750 cases “the complainant prevailed in
approximately 85% of the cases, the respondent in 15%.” Id.
301. Id.
302. See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy , ICANN,
www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2012-02-25-en#4aiii (last visited Jan. 7,
2016).
303. See id. (stating “[a]ll fees charged by a Provider in connection with any
dispute before an Administrative Panel pursuant to this Policy shall be paid by
the complainant, except in cases where you elect to expand the Administrative
Panel from one to three panelists . . . in which case all fees will be split evenly
by you and the complainant”).
304. See Bluestone, supra note 45 (stating “[t]he UDRP may prove to be a
better forum not only because of its efficiency and timeliness, but also because
of its ‘user-friendly’ quality”).
305. See MCG RADY, supra note 1, at § 9.03; see also MCG RADY, supra note
1, at § 12.04 (“The high experience levels of the arbitrators and the security of
using a uniform dispute resolution system make the UDRP route highly
efficient for victims of cybersquatting. The proceedings are much faster and
significantly lower in cost than court proceedings. Additionally, of great
importance in today’s Internet-fueled global business environment, UDRP
proceedings are multinational. Finally, use of the UDRP removes the burden of
determining rights and procedures involving domain disputes from individu al
registrars and registries.”); Bluestone, supra note 45, at 587 (noting that
“[UDRP proceedings] move quite quickly, requiring the adjudicator to come to a
decision within three weeks. In cases where the complainant prevails, the
remedy will take place 10 days after the decision is issued unless the panel is
informed by the defendant that they are initiating court proceedings [via ACPA]
on the matter”) (internal quotations omitted).
306. See MCG RADY, supra note 1, at § 9.03; see also MCG RADY, supra note
1, at § 12.04. The Policy itself states “[a]ll decisions under this Policy will be
published in full over the Internet, except when an Administrative Panel
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the UDRP provides multinational proceedings and a panel of judges
who are experts on the matter at hand. 307
Conversely, there are also some disadvantages to the UDRP. 308
The UDRP is limited in its ability to grant remedies. 309 A UDRP
panelist may only cancel or transfer a disputed domain name; he or
she may not award damages or attorney’s fees. 310 Moreover, the
UDRP does not provide for a discovery mechanism, and only applies
to use of marks in the limited scope of top-level domain names. 311
The UDRP does not apply to the use of marks in the domain’ s
content. 312
Further, the UDRP’s lack of fair use consideration is
concerning. As one scholar put it: “ICANN ‘isn’t concerned with US
First Amendment rights to free speech.’”313 This lack of concern has
led to an inconsistent application of free speech law. 314 One study
showed that U.S. panels, which hear about half of all fair use
proceedings, were friendlier to free speech interests than their
foreign counterparts. 315 As one author noted:
determines in an exceptional case to redact portions of its decision.” Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN (Adopted Aug. 26, 1999),
www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2012-02-25-en.
307. See MCG RADY, supra note 1, at § 9.03; see also MCG RADY, supra note
1, at § 12.04.
308. See MCG RADY, supra note 1, at § 9.03 (“The primary advantages of a
UDRP proceeding rather than litigation under the ACPA are the short time
frame of the proceedings and the relatively low costs. However, a UDRP
panelist may award only cancellation or transfer of the disputed domain
name(s). There is no discovery mechanism. The ACPA enjoys several
advantages over the UDRP complaint mechanism. The primary advantages are
the availability of statutory damages, injunctive relief, and perhaps attorneys’
fees, as well as access to discovery mechanisms useful to determine the full scale
of cybersquatting activities and the extent of defendant’s assets”).
309. See id. (stating that the UDRP cannot grant statutory damages,
injunctive relief, or attorneys’ fees).
310. See id. (stating that the UDRP cannot grant statutory damages,
injunctive relief, or attorneys’ fees).
311. Id. The lack of a discovery mechanism is not necessarily a bad thing.
While discovery is important for determining the full extent of the infringement,
it is often prohibitively expensive. See Martha Neil, Litigation Too Costly, EDiscovery a 'Morass,' Trial Lawyers Say, ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 09, 2008),
www.abajournal.com/news/article/litigation_too_costly_e_discovery_a_morass_
trial_lawyers_say (stating that “judges don’t do enough to control excessive
discovery (particularly e-discovery, which can be extremely expensive)”).
312. ICANN, supra note 16.
313. Wayde Brooks, Current Public Law and Policy Issues in ADR: Wrestling
Over the World Wide Web: ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy for
Domain Name Disputes, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 297, 327 (2001).
314. See David A. Simon, An Empirical Analysis of Fair Use Decisions Under
the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, 53 B.C. L. REV 65, 67–68
(2016).
315. Id. (“In other words, U.S. panels began importing U.S. law —law that
is generally (viewed as) more sensitive than the law of other countries
to free speech interests—into UDRP disputes with higher frequency than did
foreign panels. More than non-U.S. panels, U.S. panels also applied U.S. law in
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The stringent trademark requirements imposed on personal name
disputes in the context of domain names have led to confused and
often contradictory results in panel proceedings. For example, a panel
granted Julia Roberts rights to the website juliaroberts.com, while
another panel denied Bruce Springsteen rights to the website
brucespringsteen.com. Similarly, it was decided that Hillary Clinton
has rights to hillaryclinton.com, while Kathleen Kennedy Townsend
did not have rights to kathleenkennedytownsend.com.316

This lack of consistency and fairness with regard to free speech
would have to be remedied in a USRP.
Overall, in its limited capacity the UDRP provides an effective
means for trademark owners to protect their trademarks from being
used, in bad faith and without authorization, in domain names. 317
For example, in 2000, a three-member WIPO administrative panel
decided a dispute between entertainer Madonna and an unnamed
respondent who was using the Madonna.com domain name as an
adult entertainment website. 318 Entertainer Madonna had two U.S.
trademarks for the word “MADONNA.” 319 In a well written
decision, the three-member panel discussed each of the three prima
facie factors before ruling in favor of Madonna and ordering the
domain name be transferred to her. 320 The panel stated that “[t]he
disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark in which Complainant has rights; Respondent lacks
rights or legitimate interests in the domain name; and the domain
name has been registered and used in bad faith.”321 Such an
inexpensive, quick, and transparent mechanism for the resolution
of trademark disputes could be a welcome addition to the social
media arena.

cases where the respondent was from the United States. Because U.S. law is
(viewed as) more friendly to speech interests than foreign law, the use of U.S.
law favored respondents.”).
316. Pesochinsky, supra note 42, at 235.
317. See Bluestone, supra note 45, at 588–89. (listing the UDRP’s
advantages).
318. See Ciccone v. Parisi, WIPO Case No. D2000-0847 (Oct. 12, 2000) ,
www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/htm l/2000/d2000-0847.h tml.
Madonna is a pop music singer who reached worldwide fame in the 1980s. See
Madonna Biography, BIO., www.biography.com/people/madonna-9394994 (last
visited Jan. 7, 2016). By 1991, she had sold over 70 million albums
internationally and had 21 songs reach the top 10 on the United States’ music
charts. Id.
319. See id. (noting “[c]omplainant is the well-known entertainer Madonna.
She is the owner of U.S. Trademark Registrations for the mark MADONNA for
entertainment services and related goods (Reg. No. 1,473,554 and 1,463,601) .
She has used her name and mark MADONNA professionally for entertainment
services since 1979”).
320. Id.
321. Id.
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V. THE CREATION OF A USRP: A BETTER SOLUTION OR
AN UNNECESSARY MECHANISM?
The previous part analyzed the UDRP, a successful mechanism
for the resolution of domain name disputes. 322 This part will now
use the UDRP as a roadmap for what a possible similar mechanism
for the resolution of trademark and copyright disputes in social
media would look like. It will then discuss the advantages and
disadvantages to such a mechanism, ultimately concluding that
adopting a USRP is not warranted.

A. The Text of a USRP
The creation of a Uniform Social Media Intellectual Property
Dispute Resolution Policy (USRP) has been raised on a few
occasions, but no substantive policy has been set forth that covers
both trademark and copyright disputes. 323 Attorney Paul McGrady
proposed the creation of a Social Media Username Dispute
Resolution Policy limited to username squatting disputes. 324 In his
proposal, McGrady advocates for a compulsory one-person
administrative panel to adjudicate disputes in the limited scope of
username squatting. 325 McGrady sets forth the proposed text of
such a policy. 326 McGrady’s proposed “Social Media Username
Dispute Mechanism” applies where: (1) a disputed username is
“identical or confusingly similar to” a claimant’s trademark, service
mark, or personal name, (2) “the user has no rights or legitimate
interests in respect of the [u]sername,” and (3) “the [u]sername has
been registered in bad faith or is being used in bad faith.” 327 The
text of McGrady’s proposed mechanism then provides a noninclusive list of evidence of registration and use in bad faith. 328 That
evidence includes circumstances indicating that the user: (1)
intended to sell the username for valuable consideration, (2)
registered the username to prevent the mark holder from doing so
itself, (3) registered the username for the primary purpose of
disrupting a business or harassing somebody, or (4) intentionally
322. See supra part III.
323. The term “Uniform Social Media Intellectual Property Dispu te
Resolution Policy (USRP)” has been created for the purposes of this paper.
324. MCG RADY, supra note 1, at § 12.07. Paul D. McGrady is a partner at
Winston & Strawn LLP, where he practices trademarks, domain names, and
brand enforcement. Paul D. McGrady, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP,
www.winston.com/en/who-we-are/attorneys/mcgrady-paul-d.html (last visite d
Jan. 7, 2016). McGrady has also taught advanced trademarks and cyberlaw at
DePaul Law School. See id. In addition to authoring McGrady on Social Media,
McGrady has also authored McGrady on Domain Names. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. MCG RADY, supra note 1, at § 12.06.
328. Id.
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intended to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to another
location “by creating a likelihood of confusion with the
complainant’s personal name or mark as to the source, sponsorship,
affiliation, or endorsement of the disputed account.” 329 Finally,
McGrady’s proposed mechanism concludes by providing a noninclusive list of ways a user can demonstrate rights to or a
legitimate interest in a username. 330 Those rights and interests can
be proven with evidence that the user: (1) used the username in
connection with a “bona fide, non-infringing, non-harassing”
offering of goods and services before any notice of the dispute, (2) is
an individual, business, or organization commonly known by the
username in question, even if it has no trademark rights associated
with that name, or (3) is making a legitimate fair use or
noncommercial use of the username “without intent for commercial
gain, to misleadingly divert consumers, or to tarnish the trademark,
service mark, or personal name at issue.” 331
McGrady also sets forth text of a proposed contractual user
agreement. 332 Users would be compelled to agree to this contract
while registering to use the social media website. 333 However,
McGrady does not explain what compels the social media websites

329. See id. (“The following circumstances, in particular but without
limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the
registration and use of a Username in bad faith: [i] circumstances indicatin g
that the user registered or acquired the Username primarily for the purpose of
selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the username to the complainant who
is the owner of the trademark, service mark, or personal name or to a competitor
of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of documented out-ofpocket costs directly related to the username; o r [ii] the user registered the
disputed Username in order to prevent the owner of the trademark, service
mark, or personal name from reflecting the mark in a corresponding username;
[iii] the user registered the Username primarily for the purpose of disruptin g
the business of a competitor or harassing an individual whose personal name
corresponds to the user name; or [iv] by using the disputed Username, the user
intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to a
social media account or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of
confusion with the complainant’s personal name or mark as to the source,
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the disputed account or of a product
or service on a social media account or other on-line location”).
330. Id.
331. Id. (“Any of the following circumstances, in particular but without
limitation, if found by the Panel to be proved based on its evaluation of all
evidence presented, shall demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in the
Username: [i] before any notice of the dispute, the use of the Username in
connection with a bona fide, non-infringing, non-harassing offering of goods or
services; or [ii] the user is an individual, business, or other organization, which
has been commonly known by the Username, even if the individual, business,
or other organization has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or [iii]
the user is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the Username,
without intent for commercial gain, to misleadingly divert consumers, or to
tarnish the trademark, service mark, or personal name at issue”).
332. Id. at § 12.07.
333. See id.
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to partake in this system. 334 Among the important contractual
terms included in the user agreement are: fees, remedies available,
and the availability of court proceedings. 335 With regard to fees, the
cost associated with this mechanism would be paid in full by the
complainant, unless the owner of the username elects to increase
the administrative panel from one to three panelists, in which case
the costs would be split evenly between the two parties. 336 With
regard to the remedies available, the administrative panel can only
cancel the username or transfer the username to the
complainant. 337 Finally, with regard to the availability of court
proceedings, McGrady’s proposed dispute mechanism does not
prevent either party from “submitting the dispute to a court of
competent jurisdiction for independent resolution” at any time
during the process. 338
In addition to McGrady’s proposal, there have been three other
instances in which attorneys and scholars have called for the
creation of a Uniform Username Dispute Resolution mechanism. 339
All three instances have similarly limited the scope of the proposal
to that of username squatting. 340 First, in 2009 Attorney Erik Heels
posted an article on his blog about how easy it is to username squat

334. Id.
335. Id.
336. See id. (stating “[a]ll fees charged by a Provider in connection with any
dispute before an Administrative Panel pursuant to this Policy shall be paid by
the complainant, except in cases where you elect to expand the Administrative
Panel from one to three panelists, in which case all fees will be split evenly by
you and the complainant”).
337. See id. (mentioning “[t]he remedies available to a complainan t
pursuant to any proceeding before an Administrative Panel shall be limited to
requiring the cancellation of your Username or the transfer of your Username
registration to the complainant”).
338. See id. (“The mandatory administrative proceeding requirements set
forth above shall not prevent either you or the complainant from submitting the
dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before
such mandatory administrative proceeding is commenced or after such
proceeding is concluded. If an Administrative Panel decides that your
Username registration should be canceled or transferred, we will wait five (5)
business days (as observed in the location of our principal office) after we are
informed by the applicable Provider of the Administrative Panel’s decision
before implementing that decision. We will then implement the decision unless
we have received from you during that five (5) business day period official
documentation (such as a copy of a complaint, file -stamped by the clerk of the
court) that you have commenced a lawsuit against the complainant in a
jurisdiction to which the complainant has submitted. If w e receive such
documentation within the five (5) business day period, we will not implement
the Administrative Panel’s decision, and we will take no further action, until
we receive (i) evidence satisfactory to us of a resolution between the parties; (ii)
evidence satisfactory to us that your lawsuit has been dismissed or withdrawn;
or (iii) a copy of an order from such court dismissing your lawsuit or ordering
that you do not have the right to continue to use your Username”).
339. See notes 341–45, and accompanying text.
340. See notes 341–45, and accompanying text.
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some of the largest companies on social media. 341 He concluded his
article by advocating for a third-party arbitration system, which he
called the Uniform Username Dispute Resolution Policy (UUDRP),
but never described what such a solution would look like. 342 Second,
in a 2010 student-written note, Zorik Pesochinsky discussed the
need for a username squatting dispute resolution mechanism, but
the policy was only briefly discussed. 343 Finally, attorneys Steve
Levy and Kristine Dorrain proposed a similarly limited mechanism
in 2011, but their proposal merely raised the idea without
describing what such a mechanism would entail. 344 They called
their mechanism the Social Media Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy (SUDRP). 345
An ideal third-party dispute resolution mechanism would be
more expansive than just username squatting. Though a limited
mechanism would be beneficial in resolving username squatting
disputes, the breadth of intellectual property disputes on social
media is much larger. 346 An ideal mechanism would aim to resolve
trademark and copyright disputes as well. It would be illogical to
create a mechanism that aims to resolve a small subset of disputes
341. See Erik J. Heels, How To Twittersquat The Top 100 Brands: A Call for
Creation of the Uniform Username Dispute Resolution Policy ,
ERIKJHEELS .COM (Jan. 8, 2009), www.erikjheels.com/1298.html/comment-page 15#comments. Heels founded Clocktower Law LLC, a patent and trademark
firm
geared
towards
startups.
About
Erik,
ERIKJHEELS .COM ,
www.erikjheels.com/about-erik (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). Heels practices in
both patent and trademark law. See id.
342. Id.
343. Pesochinsky, supra note 46, at 247–52.
344. See Levy, supra note 134 (stating “. . . Kristine Dorrain of the Nation al
Arbitration Forum and I presented a proposal for a more streamlined dispute
resolution mechanism at the 2011 intellectual property forum hosted by the
Pennsylvania Bar Institute in Philadelphia. We argued that it is time for an
SUDRP or ‘Social Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy’ that would bring
consistency and accountability to the social media brand enforcement process
and relieve social media sites of the potential liability they currently face when
handling these disputes on their own. Much like the UDRP, an SUDRP could
include objective standards for confusion, legitimate interest, and bad faith and
would also assure timely and reliable implementation of decisions”). Levy is an
attorney with 27 years of experience who founded the Accent Law Group and
who also manages FairWind Partners’ Domain Name Reclaim Services. Steve
Levy,
FAIRWINDS
PARTNERS
BLOG,
http://blog.fairwindspartners.
com/authors/steve-levy (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). Prior to joining FairWinds,
Levy was a Senior Director at The Home Depot’s legal department where he
managed their intellectual property. Id. Kristine Dorrain is the National
Arbitration Forum’s Director of Internet and IP Service. Kristine Dorrain,
ICANN WIKI , http://icannwiki.com/Kristine_Dorrain (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
Mr. Levy, through email and in preparation for this comment, graciously
provided me with a copy of the slideshow Ms. Dorain and he used at the 2011
Intellectual Property Forum.
345. Steve Levy, through email correspondence, was kind enough to provide
me with a slideshow he presented about the SUDRP.
346. For a discussion on the varying types of trademark and copyright issue s
on social media, see Part I.
the
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while leaving out other important intellectual property disputes
that arise. This would not solve many of the issues described
earlier—transparency, fairness, and uniformity. 347 Creating
uniformity in one subset of intellectual property issues while
ignoring it in the larger category would likely lead to more
inconsistency and confusion.
An ideal mechanism for the resolution of disputes on social
media would cover both trademark and copyright disputes. This
would, in theory, solve many of the issues that arise in the
previously discussed courses of action. 348 Unlike the internal
policies the social media websites have created to deal with
takedown requests, the USRP would create a more uniform
policy. 349 Eliminating a system with differing policies in favor of one
solitary mechanism would reduce confusion. 350 Unlike cease-anddesist letters, the USRP would have legal clout and would be
binding on both parties. 351 Finally, unlike litigation, the USRP
could reduce cost and offer speedy resolutions. 352 Further, the USRP
would create transparency by publishing decisions. 353
The USRP would be modeled after the UDRP and the
aforementioned proposed username squatting dispute resolution
mechanisms. 354 Just as domain registrants are contractually
obligated to submit to the UDRP, social media websites can update
their terms of services to contractually obligate all users to submit
347. For a discussion of these issues, see notes 133–39, and accompanyin g
text.
348. As discussed earlier, reporting infringement directly to the social media
website lacks transparency, and the various policies differ on substantive
issues. See supra notes 133–39, and accompanying text. Sending a cease -anddesist letter has no judicial backing, can open the sender up to a flood of
negative publicity, and can be used as a bullying tactic. See supra Part II(B).
Further, initiating a lawsuit is often expensive, time consuming, and the law
surrounding the matter can be unclear. See supra Part II(C).
349. For a discussion on the social media internal reporting system s
currently in place, see supra Part II(A).
350. See Levy, supra note 134 (stating “[t]he patchwork of policies that
arises from each site establishing its own procedures can be frustrating to
trademark owners tasked with enforcing their marks”); MCG RADY, supra note
1, at § 12.03 (mentioning “[e]ven three of the largest social media sites have
vastly different approaches to username squatting and users’ rights. The
differing approaches to username disputes must logically lead to inconsistency
of outcomes, although there is little data on the subject. At the very least, the
inconsistency in approach to the subject renders planning and prediction nearly
impossible for users desiring to protect their names or brands”).
351. For a discussion on cease-and-desist letters, see supra Part II(B).
352. For a discussion on litigating intellectual property disputes that arise
on social media, see supra Part II(C).
353. USRP decisions would be published similar to how UDRP decisions are
published. For a discussion on how UDRP decisions are published, see supra
note 306, and accompanying text.
354. See supra Part III for a discussion on the UDRP. McGrady similarly
based his proposed Social Media Username Dispute Resolution Policy on the
UDRP. See MCG RADY, supra note 1, at § 12.07 n. 56.
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to the USRP. 355 The social media websites would be encouraged to
partake in such a system because it would decrease their costs and
liability. 356 Under the current system, social media websites have to
hire employees to assess and adjudicate takedown requests; their
costs are all internalized. 357 Further, these social media websites
still face litigation over the mishandling of takedown requests. 358
However, subscribing to the USRP would allow the websites to shift
their cost to the disputing parties and eliminate their liability due
to the fact that they are outsourcing the organization that reviews
takedown requests.
The USRP would serve as a mechanism to protect trademark
and copyright owners from: (1) username squatting, (2) trademark
infringement, and (3) copyright infringement. An administrative
panel consisting of one judge would adjudicate the proceedings.
However, this panel could be expanded to three judges upon
request.
The username squatting provisions would be nearly identical
to those set forth by McGrady. 359 As to trademark and copyright
disputes, the USRP would track current U.S. laws pertaining to
those issues. In order to prevail on a claim of trademark
infringement, a claimant must prove that: (1) he or she owns a valid,
protectable trademark (registration is not required), (2) the alleged
infringer used the trademark without the claimant’s consent, and
(3) the trademark is used in a manner likely to cause confusion
among ordinary consumers as to the true mark’s source, owner, or
affiliation.
In order to prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, a
claimant must prove that: (1) he or she owns a valid, protectable
copyright (registration is not required), (2) the alleged infringer
used the copyrighted work without the claimant’s consent, and (3)
the alleged infringer did not use the copyrighted work for purpose s

355. See supra note 296, and accompanying text.
356. An argument could be made that forcing users to submit to the USRP
would possibly deter people from signing up for these social media websites.
However, this argument is purely speculative. Most users do not read the terms
and conditions, and it is unlikely that the addition of a submission clause would
deter people from signing up. See Amanda Scherker, Didn't Read Facebook's
Fine Print? Here's Exactly What It Says, THE HUFFINGTON POST (July 21, 2014),
www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/21/facebook-terms-condition_n_5551965.
html (stating that most people “blindly agreed to Facebook's Terms and
Conditions without reading the fine print,” and citing a Carnegie Mellon study
that “determined that it would take the average American 76 work days to read
all the privacy policies they agreed to each year”). Liability for the social media
websites would be decreased if Congress passed a law which would provide a
safe harbor for websites that agree to the USRP.
357. For a discussion of these internal policies, see Part II(A).
358. For an example, see notes 51–59 (LaRussa v. Twitter); 60–65 (Oneok,
Inc. v. Twitter); 51–59 (Reilly v. Twitter), and accompanying text.
359. For a discussion on the username squatting policy set forth by
McGrady, see notes 328–31, and accompanying text.
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such as criticism, commentary, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, research, or resale.
The USRP would handle fees differently than the way proposed
by McGrady. McGrady wants all fees to be paid by the claimant. 360
This policy seems unfair when a user is clearly infringing on a
claimant’s intellectual property rights. A more fair system would
allow for fee shifting if the plaintiff prevails.
Remedies would also be more expansive than those set forth by
McGrady. 361 This is due to the fact that cancellation and transfer of
the account are not sufficient in a system that covers more than just
username squatting. The remedies available to a complainant
would be: (1) in the case of username squatting, the termination of
the username or the transfer of the username to the complainant,
and (2) in the case of trademark infringement or copyright
infringement (i) the removal of the infringing post; and (ii) possible
suspension or termination of the host account. An account would be
suspended or terminated only in the case of a recidivist infringer
(the user has committed trademark of copyright infringement on
more than one occasion) or when actual malice is found (the user
knowingly infringed with the intent to cause harm).
The USRP would ideally condense the time period compared to
that of litigation. Upon receipt of a complaint, the alleged infringer
would be given 10 business days to submit a response. The panel
would reach a verdict within 10 business days from receiving the
response. Additionally, similar to McGrady’s proposal, parties may
submit their dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction at any
time. 362
Now that the framework for the USRP has been set forth, it is
vital to assess whether adopting such a mechanism would be
beneficial to the current courses of action.

B. Advantages and Disadvantages to the USRP
There are both advantages and disadvantages to the adoption
of a USRP. First, the USRP allows for a quicker resolution of
disputes than does litigation. Given the instantaneous nature of the
Internet and the fact that an infringing post can have irreversible
and lasting effects on a person or company within minutes of its
publication, such a speedy resolution is necessary. 363 However, the
USRP would still take up to 20 business days to render a decision. 364
360. For a discussion on the fee terms set forth by McGrady, see note 336,
and accompanying text.
361. For a discussion on the remedies terms set forth by McGrady, see note
337, and accompanying text.
362. For a discussion on the availability of court proceedings terms set forth
by McGrady, see note 338, and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 274–77, and accompanying text.
364. Under the UDRP, most disputes are resolved within 60 days. The
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Although this is certainly faster than initiating a lawsuit, it might
not be fast enough to prevent or halt the damage that an infringing
post exacts on a person or company. 365 A 20-day turnaround would
likely mitigate damage caused by username squatters or recidivist
infringers. 366 However, it would be unlikely to mitigate damage
done by a single post that infringes on a trademark or copyright. 367
Moreover, this 20-day turnaround is slower than action by a social
media website itself, and would also be slower than an infringing
user’s immediate compliance to a cease-and-desist letter. 368
Second, the USRP allows for a more uniform application of the
laws compared to takedown requests and cease-and-desist letters.
Similar to litigation, the USRP would strive to maintain an
administrative panel that would uniformly apply the law. 369
However, though the law may be uniform, it is not realistic to
assume that the application of those laws by various panels will be
uniform, especially if the panels are composed of people from
different countries with different legal systems. 370 Nonetheless, the
USRP would do its best to foster a system that is consistent in
applying the law.
Though uniform application of the law is typically favored, it is
unclear whether it is ideal in the current situation because user
expectations vary amongst the various social media websites. For
example, Facebook and Twitter have differing policies regarding
parody accounts. 371 Facebook has a per se ban on all fake accounts,
while Twitter allows parody accounts in certain circumstances. 372

UDRP
Process,
BERKMAN
CTR.
FOR
INTERNET
&
SOC’Y ,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/udrp/process.html#timeline (last visited Jan. 7,
2016); see also Bluestone, supra note 45, at 588 (mentioning “[UDRP
proceedings] move quite quickly, requiring the adjudicator to come to a decision
within three weeks. In cases where the complainant prevails, the remedy will
‘take place 10 days after the decision is issued unless the panel is informed by
the defendant that they are initiating court proceedings [via ACPA] on the
matter”) (internal quotations omitted). The USRP would further streamline this
process in order to resolve disputes in 10 to 20 days.
365. See supra notes 272–73, and accompanying text. As stated earlier, the
average time for intellectual property litigation is three years, but has been seen
to last more than seven years. See supra notes 272–73, and accompanying text.
366. For a discussion on why such a turnaround would mitigate damage
caused by username squatters and recidivist infringers, but not damage caused
by a single infringing post, see supra note 271–75, and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 274–77, and accompanying text.
368. As stated previously, social media websites are vague and ambiguou s
when discussing how long it takes them to address a complaint, but most
complaints are resolved within a few days. See supra Part II(A).
369. For a discussion of how litigation ensures that the judiciary uniformly
applies the law, see supra notes 260–61, and accompanying text.
370. For a discussion on the inconsistency of UDRP decisions, see supra
notes 313–17, and accompanying text.
371. For a comparison of Facebook’s and Twitter’s parody account policie s,
see supra Part II(A).
372. See supra Part II(A). Facebook had such a strict “real name” policy that
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The USRP would eliminate this discrepancy, but does one really
want a blanket policy that either bans fake accounts per se or allows
parody accounts? Facebook users sign up and use the website
knowing that the users behind an account are usually who they say
they are. 373 Twitter users, on the other hand, are more accustomed
to fake or parody accounts; some users even consider the inclusion
of parody accounts to be an added feature. 374 People like to clump
these varying social media websites into one “social media”
conglomerate. 375 However, each website is distinct and different, so
a uniform solution might not be desirable. 376
Third, the USRP provides users with a more cost effective
dispute resolution mechanism compared to litigation. As discussed
earlier in the comment, litigation costs regarding trademark and
copyright infringement are prohibitive. 377 However, reporting the
infringement directly to the social media website is typically free. 378
The USRP would offer users a more traditional forum, similar to a
court, while keeping costs down.
Fourth, the USRP offers a more global solution than does filing
a lawsuit in a national court. A number of jurisdictional issues
regarding the Internet have arisen in recent years. 379 People from

it received negative backlash after banning some transgender users who had
used their chosen name instead of their legal name. See Joseph Patrick
McCormick, Facebook to do Away With ‘Real Name’ Policy, PINK NEWS (Oct. 31,
2015), www.pinknews.co.uk/2015/10/31/facebook-to-do-away-with-real-name policy/. In response to this, Facebook made some minor changes to their policy,
and now allows users to use “authentic names.” See id. Using an “authentic
name” allows users to create an account that does not use their legal name, so
long as they are using a name that they are known by to family and friends. See
id.
373. For a discussion of Facebook’s “real person” policies, see supra Parts
II(A)(1).
374. See Katie Burke, The 10 Best Parody Twitter Accounts to Follow ,
HUBSPOT BLOGS (Feb. 10, 2014), http://blog.hubspot.com/marketing/tw itte r parody-accounts-list (listing the “top 10 parody Twitter accounts [the author]
think[s] you should start following today, along with some shining examples of
their tongue-in-cheek Twitter brilliance”).
375. Over half of all Americans use two or more social media websites. More
People Use Multiple Social Media Websites, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 8, 2015),
www.pewinternet.org/2015/01/09/social-media-update-2014/pi_2015-01-09_soci
al-media_09/.
376. For a discussion on how each social media website is distinct and
different, see supra Part II(A).
377. For a discussion of the high cost of litigation involving intellectu al
property disputes, see supra notes 263–71, and accompanying text.
378. No social media website ever mentions a cost or fee to report
infringement. See FACEBOOK, supra note 137; see also TWITTER, supra note 163.
379. See TiTi Nguyen, A Survey of Personal Jurisdiction based on Internet
Activity: A Return to Tradition, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (2004) (“By its very
nature, the Internet is without boundaries. Any person connected to the
Internet can access it and is limited in her activity only by the current state of
technology. Additionally, the Internet rapidly changes to adapt to new
technological innovations. In contrast, personal jurisdiction doctrine prevents
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all parts of the world use social media websites, meaning that
initiating litigation and sending a cease-and-desist letter is often
futile. Litigation is jurisdictionally bound. 380 An intellectual
property owner can sue an infringing user in another country, but
this might influence the cost and the predictability of the
outcome. 381 Additionally, an intellectual property owner could send
a cease-and-desist letter to an infringing user in another country
and threaten suit, but the threat might not be as convincing. 382
However, reporting infringement directly to the social media
website itself is also multinational. 383 It is clear that a multinational
solution is necessary when creating the ideal mechanism for solving
trademark and copyright disputes in the social media arena;
however, it is unclear whether the USRP would offer a better
multinational solution than the current system of direct-reporting.
Finally, the USRP provides for more transparency and
predictability in both the application and results of the proceeding s
compared to takedown requests and cease-and-desist letters. This
is vital to the success of any dispute resolution mechanism, and is
one of the main benefits of this system over the current system of
reporting the infringement directly to the social media website from
the user’s and general public’s point of view. 384 Sending a cease-anddesist letter and filing an infringement report with the social media
website lacks transparency in result. 385 Though settling a dispute
in court would allow for adequate transparency and predictability,
litigation is often not feasible due to the high cost and time
required. 386 This factor weighs in favor of adopting a uniform
dispute resolution mechanism.
However, when looking at these factors in the aggregate, it
seems clear that a USRP is undesirable. The USRP would be slower
courts from exercising their power beyond the geographical boundaries of their
authority. This limitation derives from the interests in protecting defendants
against undue litigation burdens and in preventing state courts from infringing
upon the sovereignty of other states. The rise of litigation relating to Internet
activity raises concerns about applying personal jurisdiction rules developed in
geographical space to a means of exchanging information that has no
boundaries.”).
380. Id.; see also Joseph W. Goodman, The Pros and Cons of Online Dispute
Resolution: An Assessment of Cyber-Mediation Websites, 2003 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV . 4 (2003) (noting “[t]raditional mechanisms [for resolving Internet
disputes], such as litigation, can be time-consuming, expensive and raise
jurisdictional problems”).
381. See Admin, Can I Sue Someone in a Foreign Country?, RYAN
ALEXANDER (Aug. 19, 2008), www.ryanalexander.us/2008/08/can-i-su e someone-in-a-foreign-country/ (stating that, although sometimes possible, “it is
difficult and expensive to sue people in foreign countries”).
382. See supra Part II(C).
383. A person from any country can file an infringement report to any of the
three social media websites discussed earlier. See supra Part II(A).
384. See supra note 134–39, and accompanying text.
385. See supra Part II(A)–(B).
386. See supra Part II(C).
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and more costly than the current system of reporting infringement
directly to the social media websites. 387 Moreover, a uniform
solution would strip social media websites of their ability to build
and foster a unique platform and would be no more multinational
than the current direct-reporting system. 388 The sole advantage
that the USRP would have over users reporting directly to social
media websites is its ability to provide users with transparency and
predictability. But this begs the question: why not just require more
transparency from social media sites?

VI. THE B EST SOLUTION : MAKING C HANGES TO THE
CURRENT DIRECT-REPORTING SYSTEM
There is a definite need for transparency and predictability in
the administration and creation of intellectual property policies on
social media websites; however, this problem could be solved
without the creation of a USRP. When discussing what an ideal
resolution would look like, it is important to analyze the various
parties involved and how their goals differ. An ideal solution would
balance protecting the rights of intellectual property owners with
protecting the rights of the public and those accused of
infringement. A trademark or copyright owner usually just wants
the infringing material removed. 389 This group would be happy with
a system that quickly and inexpensively removes infringing
material, even if such a system lacks transparency and fairness in
decisions. 390 Social media users, on the other hand, would prefer a
387. For a discussion of the cost and time involved with reportin g
infringement directly to social media websites, see supra notes 185–87, and
accompanying text (providing an example of how Twitter only took 48 hours to
respond to a takedown request).
388. See supra notes 371–83, and accompanying text. As stated earlier,
users have different expectations of the different social media websites. See id.
Users on Facebook expect all accounts to be real, while users on Twitter and
YouTube understand and enjoy the fact that some accounts will be fake or
parody accounts. See supra Parts II(A)(1)–(3).
389. See MELVIN JOSEPH DE G EETER, TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZAT I O N
MANUAL: STRATEGY, TACTICS AND ECONOMICS FOR BUSINESS SUCCESS 107
(2004) (discussing the primary considerations of an intellectual property
owner). Though, a trademark and copyright owner might also want to
determine the identity of the poster and avoid bad publicity. See id.
390. Id. Of course, IP owners may want transparency if the site refuses to
remove the infringing material (they want to know why) and want a system
that is “fair” to them. Id.; see also MCG RADY, supra note 1, at § 12.03 (“The
difficulty and high costs of protecting numerous brands and monitoring an ever expanding number of social media sites is unaffordable for many small or midsized companies who look to the Internet as a low-cost way of publicizing and
running their businesses. As such, those companies face a much higher
possibility of suffering from consumer confusion and brand dilution online,
which could go on undiscovered for great lengths of time. The resulting
uncertainty trickles down to consumers who cannot trust the authenticity of
brands with which they might otherwise confidently conduct business online[. .
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transparent and consistent system. 391 Without transparency and
consistency, it would be difficult for users to determine whether
their posts infringe on another’s rights. Such confusion could
ultimately lead to fewer (or different) posts, which would constrain
the goals of users and social media sites. This could ultimately hurt
a third group, the general public, by stifling free speech and
discussion. The general public wants a system that balances all of
the goals: fairness, accuracy in decisions, consistency, cost, time,
and transparency.
An ideal solution would provide the copyright and trademark
owners with a quick and inexpensive resolution of disputes. The
ideal solution’s decisions would be accurate and consistent, and the
administration of its policies would be transparent from the initial
submission of the dispute to the final decision. Though creating the
USRP as a fourth solution might make achieving these goals
attainable, its creation is plainly unnecessary. Each of these goals
can be satisfied through the existing framework of reporting the
infringement to the social media site, so long as fundamental
changes are made. 392
Reporting infringement directly to the social media website is
inexpensive, easy, and quick—all positives for intellectual property
owners.393 However, it lacks transparency, which makes it unclear
whether this option optimizes fairness, accuracy in decisions, and
consistency—all negatives for users and the general public. 394
Ensuring that social media websites are more transparent would
make that option more ideal for all parties involved.
In order to determine how to make the social media websites
more transparent, it is important to remember why the websites
. ] While the high costs of protecting brands may be difficult for many smaller
companies, those costs are prohibitive for individuals who like ly do not have the
manpower to monitor every possible site requiring a username. The result is
that individuals seeking to provide products or services via their social media
presence or individuals who are the targets of bullies may suffer at the hands
of a competitor or inadvertent infringer without their knowledge for a
protracted period of time. Those same individuals, upon discovering that their
usernames have been abused, will then face uncertainty as to how to proceed,
depending on the platform at issue and the exact manner of the abuse. A
uniform rule and procedure regarding username disputes will give everyone —
both victims and transgressors—more security regarding the consequences of
their actions.”).
391. See DE G EETER, supra note 391, at 107–08 (discussing the primary
considerations for those concerned with being accused of infringement); see also
MCG RADY, supra note 1, at § 12.03 (stating that “[a] uniform rule and procedure
regarding username disputes will give everyone —both victims and
transgressors—more security regarding the consequences of their actions”).
392. For a discussion of the existing framework, see supra Part II(A). That
section provides an in depth discussion of the various internal policies of social
media websites—Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube—and how they compare with
one another. See supra Part II(A).
393. See supra note 133, and accompanying text.
394. See supra note 134, and accompanying text.
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currently lack transparency. As discussed previously in this paper,
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are unclear in their internal
decision making process. 395 The various policies differ on
substantive issues, and the policies are often vague and difficult to
understand. 396 Additionally, the websites do not publish decisions
and take down requests, and do not mandate a time frame for the
process. 397 This has lead some people to describe the decision
making process as a black box, as “only a few providers
systematically release notices and none explicitly describe their
procedures.”398
For the current system to maximize the goals set forth above,
social media websites must be clearer about their policies. They
must inform users of how long it will take to address infringement
issues, when they can expect a decision to be issued, and the
standards used to warrant a take down. The social media websites
must work with one another to create coherent policies.
Further, social media websites must be more transparent
about their actions and the decision making process. They should
publish every takedown request received, or be required to submit
such takedown requests to third-party websites that collect data on
the matter. 399 Moreover, social media websites must release
information on the result of the takedown requests. Such a database
that details which alleged infringements are in violation of the
policies and which alleged infringements are not in violation of the
policies, would give users a level of predictability that is lacking
from the current system. 400 It is true that this system would likely
increase costs for social media websites; they would need to spend
more time creating a written “opinion” that sets forth the reason for
395. See supra notes 135–39, and accompanying text. McGrady states that
“even three of the largest social media sites [Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn]
have vastly different approaches to username squatting and users’ rights.” See
MCG RADY, supra note 1, at § 12.03. He goes on to state that these “differing
approaches to username disputes must logically lead to inconsistency of
outcomes.” See id. And even if the outcomes are similar, this inconsistency in
approach, at the least, “renders planning and prediction nearly impossible for
users desiring to protect their names or brands.” See id.
396. See supra notes 134–36, and accompanying text.
397. See supra Part II(A). Although some takedown requests are sent to
third-party websites, the results of those requests are never released. See supra
note 139, and accompanying text (describing how websites like Chilling Effects
and The Takedown Project publish some social media takedown requests). Not
all social media websites provide takedown requests to these third-party
websites, however, and those that do often redact so much information that the
takedown request is rendered moot as a predictive tool. See De Ruyck, supra
note 139; CHILLING EFFECTS , supra note 128; TAKEDOWN PROJECT, supra note
139.
398. See De Ruyck, supra note 139.
399. For a discussion on websites that collect data on takedown requests,
see supra note 139.
400. For a discussion on the lack of predictability in the current self reporting system, see supra notes 135–39, and accompanying text.
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their decision. However, Congress could incentivize such action by
requiring publication of this information in return for a safe harbor
defense. Ultimately, implementing these policies would solve the
inadequacies of the current self-regulatory mechanism without the
need to create a new mechanism.

VII. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, a USRP, while possibly
attainable, is not desirable. Regulation by social media websites, if
modified as suggested, is the best option for both the infringer and
the infringed. It is easy to clump social media websites together and
talk about them as one entity; however, they are distinct entities
with distinct goals and users. 401 While users on Facebook expect
accounts to be an accurate portrayal of the user behind it, users on
Twitter and YouTube are aware that many accounts are parodies. 402
It would be undesirable to create one policy to satisfy both groups.
Reporting infringement directly to the social media website is
far from perfect. Its biggest issue is lack of transparency. Social
media sites must work with one another to create coherent and
cohesive policies. The policies should clearly state how long it will
take for a decision to be issued. Further, in order to foster
transparency, websites should publish every takedown request they
receive and the result of the request.

401. See supra notes 371–76, and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 373–74, and accompanying text.

